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INTRODUCTION
On June 28, 19^-8, a special session of the Cominform passed the resolution which expelled the Yugoslav
communists from the international communist movement.
The break between the Soviet Union and the relatively
small Balkan nation left Western observers undecided
about its significance.

Some saw in it nothing but a

squabble between two gangs of communists that could and
would easily be resolved.

Others regarded it as a

senseless act of David and Goliath defiance without
greater significance.
In retrospect, however, it seems clear that the
break was of greater importance than either one of these
interpretations suggested at the time.

The Yugoslav

dissent, the existence of an independent ex-satellite,
could not but have an impact upon the centralized mono
lithic communist movement.
After 1948 Yugoslavia slowly developed its own
institutions and an ideology different from that of the
U.S.S.R.

The Balkan nation took, as the Yugoslavs would

call it, its own path to socialism.

I would like to

concentrate my examination of Yugoslavia mainly on its
ideology.

The paper seeks to examine this ideology in

the light of its development and consequences and to
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form conclusions as to the evolution of the Yugoslav
path and its significance to the developments within the
Soviet Bloc.
The subject will he discussed in four chapters which
are topically arranged.

Chapter one considers the pro

blem of internationalism and national communism; chapter
two discusses the evolution of the Yugoslav system; chap
ter three examines the Yugoslav ideology in detail; and
chapter four reflects on the significance of the Yugoslav
experience to developments within the Soviet Bloc.

The

concluding remarks will he presented in the last chapter.
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CHAPTER I
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM - UNIFORMITY AND DIVERSITY
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL COMMUNISM
Today national Communism is a general phenomenon
in Communism.
To varying degrees all Communist
movements, except that of the U.S.S.R. against
which it is directed, are gripped by national
Communism.
No single form of Communism, no
matter how similar it is to other forms, exists
in any way other than national Communism.
In
order to maintain itself, it must become national.
Whatever the communist world might think of Milovan
Djilas' reasoning, national communism is a reality today
After the Soviet-Yugoslav break in 1948 and the Polish
and Hungarian revolutions of 1956, national communism
appeared as a force that had to be reckoned with.

Two

different streams of thought had evolved; one that sup
ported the idea of a monolithic communist movement under
the control of Moscow and another which favored a policentristic movement bound together by the common adher
ence to Marxist ideology.
The Internationalism of Marx and Engels
It has been over a century ago that Marx and Engels
appealed to the world proletariat to unite.

Their

■^Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the
Communist System (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957)
p5 l8l.
2Ibid., p. 174.
3
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stirring exclamation:

"Workers of the world unite" has

never since ceased to inspire their followers.

The fa

thers of scientific socialism uttered these words in the
conviction that "the working men have no country," that
"national differences and antagonisms between people are
daily more and more vanishing," and that "the supremacy
of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still
f a s t e r . I n d e e d , Marx and Engels had no favorable con
ception of either a state or a nation.^- Instead, they
proposed a doctrine of internationalism.
nationalism as a relic of feudalism.

They regarded

As economic deter-

manists, Marx and Engels perceived nationalism just like
religion, as part of the false ideological consciousness
which favored the retainment of conservative economic and
social forces and thus aided the retardation of progress.
From the standpoint of Marxist social philosophy, social
ism and nationalism are incompatible with one another.
As an outgrowth of Marxism, communism retained the
idea that by definition communism and nationalism are
opposites.

The term, national communism, is then, at

least as far as communist theory is concerned, a logical
absurdity.

Even Tito, generally regarded as the apostle

3warl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, ed. Samuel H. Beer (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1955), p. 29^George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1951), P- 871-
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of national communism, denies its existence.

5

He refutes

the constant charges which refer to the Yugoslav commu
nists as bourgeois nationalists and asserts that the
Yugoslav communists too are internationalists.

Given the

Yugoslav conception of communist internationalism^ and
intercommunist relations, Tito's stand can indeed be
justified.
Communist Uniformity, 1917 - 19^5
The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the development
of socialism in Russia did strange things to the Marxian
doctrine of internationalism.

For nearly thirty years

Soviet Russia was the only communist country on the
globe.

After the October Revolution, Lenin and the

Russian Bolsheviks in general believed that their revo
lution could not survive without successful proletarian
uprisings elsewhere.

As the hopes for immediate world

revolution came to naught, the attention of the communist
leadership was drawn more and more toward Russia and
Russian problems.

The idea of world revolution was not

abandoned but rather relegated to the indefinite future.
^Bernard Morris, "Soviet Policy Toward National
Communism: The Limits of Diversity," The American Poli
tical Science Review, LIII (March, 1959 )> P • 12b.
^For definition of internationalism see: Yugo
slavia1s Way: The Program of the League of Yugoslav
Communists (New York: All Nations Press, 195^)j P P •
66-b7.
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6
In a communist Russia, surrounded by enemies, nationalism
came to have a considerable impact upon the policies of
the Soviet leadership.^

The adoption of Stalin's policy

of socialism in one country as against Trotzky's doctrine
of permanent revolution reflects these tendencies.

From

now on Russia, rather than world communism, found itself
in the center of importance.

With the rise of fascism in

Europe, the task of world communism became more and more
the defense of Soviet Russia rather than the instigation
O
of proletarian uprisings.
The success of Soviet Russia
became equated with the success of world communism.
The Communist International which had been estab
lished to further world revolution was now used as a tool
for Soviet foreign policy aims.

Revolutionary attempts

were staged or recalled in accordance with Soviet interest.
The communist parties of the world were so molded by the
Comintern and so fearful of the military threat to the
base of world revolution that their primary loyalty was
extended to the Soviet Union and Stalin rather than to
the international proletariat.

Anyone who did not give

his complete love and devotion to Soviet Russia was in
the eyes of the Comintern nothing but a bourgeois
7i ssac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography
(New York and London:
Oxford University Press, 1948),
p. 327O
Michael T. Florinsky, World Revolution and the
U.S.S.R. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933)j
p. 208 .
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nationalist.

By a strange turn of events., Marxian inter

nationalism had become some kind of nationalism, loyalty
to the one existing communist community.^
The emergence of nationalism within the communist
international movement could he prevented as long as the
U.S.S.R. remained the only communist state.

Aided by the

rise of fascism, Stalin was able to maintain a monolithic
movement by employing two main devices.

For one he im

plemented the deification of Lenin on grounds of which
Stalin claimed infallibility for himself.

For another he

used the Comintern as a means of control over the na
tional communist parties.
The cult of Leninism was carefully instituted.
Against the wishes of Krupskaja, Lenin's widow, the dead
man's body was embalmed.

It was then put on display in

the mausoleum which Stalin had erected in Lenin's honor.
The religion of communism now had its saint - the demi
god Lenin.10

Along with the institutionalization of the

Lenin cult, Stalin launched a campaign designed to prove
that he and only he was the dead man's true desciple.
This effort necessitated the revision of historic events.
%h.is view is expressed by Djilas,oj3. cit., p. l8l.
10Boris Souvarine, Stalin: A Critical Survey of
Bolshevism (New York: Longmans, Green and Company,
1939)i P- 352.
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On Stalin’s orders history was rewritten.

The new ver

sion of early Bolshevik history portrayed Stalin as the
one chosen to carry on the mission of the m a s t e r . ^
As the living desciple of the dead Lenin, Stalin's
word became the ultimate truth.

Stalin became infalli

ble; the sole interpreter of Marxism - Leninism.

He

laid down the line of strategy and tactics in theory and
practice for the entire movement.

Deviationism on the

left and right was not tolerated.

The communists every

where had to accept Stalin's policy line or suffer penal
ties of one sort or another.

The least they could expect

was expulsion from the respective communist party.
The Comintern was employed to safeguard the mono
lithic interpretation of theory and practice.

The meet

ings of the Comintern organs were used to determine the
policy line and the leadership of the entire movement.
Due to the fact that this institution had ever since 193°
been firmly controlled by the Soviet Party, it served as
a means to assure compliance to Stalin's interpretation
of truth.

Whenever deviationist tendencies were detec

ted, Stalin threw his support to those who were support
ing his version of the party line.

When it was deemed

■'•■^'Eugene Lyons, Stalin, Czar of All Russians (Phila
delphia: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1940 ) , p . 151.
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necessary a whole party was disolved, as was the case
with the Polish Communist Party.

12

Short of this, other

national parties were purged of their leadership.

Those

who displaced the fallen leaders were communists trained
hy the Comintern in Moscow and regarded as loyal follow
ers of the Stalinist regime.

Stalin was thus able to

keep his movement clear of potential threats to its
monolithic unity.
In regard to the coming world revolution, Stalin
proclaimed the doctrine of one single path to socialism.
This doctrine asserted that all nations establishing .
socialism were to follow the path traveled by Soviet
Russia.

Proletarian revolutions everywhere were to fol

low the pattern established by the October Revolution.
The Problem of Diversity
As long as there existed only one communist state,
deviationism within the communist movement had been pre
vented by Stalin's claim to infallibility and by the con
trol exercised by the Comintern.

With the emergence of

communist nations in East Europe and Asia, communism took
various forms.

Conditions and circumstances in these

countries differed widely from those encountered by
Bolsheviks in Russia.

These different conditions

12Adam Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 42.
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demanded corresponding responses.

The methods and insti

tutions developed in the U.S.S.R. were not necessarily
applicable to the situation faced by communist regimes
elsewhere.

The communists in the East European People's

Democracies were faced with the alternative of either
following the Soviet example or to respond to the need
of their respective countries.

For some time after 1945

Stalin tolerated minor variations from the Soviet path.1^
By 1947 he, however, believed that the reigns ought to be
tightened and the monolithic unity retained.

14

In order to assure conformity to the Soviet approach
to socialism within the Communist Camp, Stalin returned
to his previous method of control.

The Comintern which

had been abolished at the end of World War II as a ges
ture to the allies was now reborn as the Cominform.

This

method of control, however, proved unsuccessful under the
changed conditions.

Its failure became explicit when the

Cominform was unable to discipline the Yugoslav Communist
Party.
The leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party did
not wish to subordinate its Party completely to the
wishes and dictates of the Soviet Party.

It was not

■^Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity
and Conflict (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19&1)^
p. 41.
l4Ibid., p. 67 .
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willing to follow blindly the Soviet, road to socialism.
Rather, the Yugoslav leaders intended to develop insti
tutions and employ methods beneficial primarily to the
Balkan nation.

This demand clashed with Stalin's doc

trine of one single path to socialism.

With the Yugoslav

insistence on its own path to socialism, national com
munism was born.

Within the rest of the Soviet Bloc,

uniformity was reasserted.
Yugoslav National Communism
As the term suggests, national communism contains
elements of nationalism (other than Soviet) and communism
Nationalism, just as communism, is one of our modern day
ideologies.1^

That nationalism represents a force in

today's world goes without saying.
nation is, is much harder.

To pinpoint what a

Tribal and professional loyal

ties are easy enough to explain.

People who have a com

mon background always tend to regard themselves as a
group.

Why diverse groups of people who do not

^Carl J. Friedrich regards ideologies as syndromes
of action-oriented ideas which typically contain "a pro
gram and a strategy for its realization . . . Their key
function is to unite or at least integrate organizations
that are built up in response to them, whether movements,
parties, interest groups, or other . . . An ideology is
a set of literate ideas - a reasonably coherent body of
notions concerning practical means of how to change and
reform (or, indeed, how to preserve) a given body politic
and society which it orders.
It embodies a more or less
elaborate criticism (or the criticism of such criticism)
of what is wrong with the existing or antecedent society
and its political order."
("Ideologies in Politics:
A
Theoretical Comment," Slavic Review, Yol. XXIV December
1965 PP- 612-613.)
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necessarily share a similar background feel as one is
much harder to say.
The causes of nationality are not easily detectable
and it is therefore difficult to define nationality in
relation to its causes.

Whatever the causes of national

ism, its consequences can be seen more readily.

Nation

alism manifests itself when, for whatever reasons, a
group of people is so conscious of its distinctiveness
that it rejects being dominated by foreigners.1^

In

the case of communist Yugoslavia, nationalism found its
manifestation in the occurances of 19^8 .
For whatever reasons, the Yugoslav communist leader
ship resented Soviet domination and exploitation of its
country.

Tito and his associates insisted on directing

their country's affairs without outside interference.
They.wished to develop those institutions and procedures
most beneficial to Yugoslavia.

In this sense the Yugo

slav leaders were nationalists, but they were communists
as well.

They adhered to the doctrine of Marxism-

Leninism and were loyal to the country of socialism^ the
U.S.S.R.

Their loyalty, however, was split.

The

Yugoslav communists were devoted to the Soviet Union and
its Party, but they also loved their country.

When the

^Frederick M. Watkins, The Age of Ideology Political Thought, 1750 to the Present (Englewood Cliffs
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 196-4), p. 38~.
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time came to choose between loyalty to the Soviet Union
and love for their nation, the Yugoslav communist leader
ship chose the latter.

Tito gave a classical utterance

to his nationalism when he stated:

"However much affec

tion any of us may cherish toward the country of Social
ism, the U.S.S.R., in no way should have less affection
for his own country . .
No matter how strong their nationalism, the Yugoslavs
did not wish to break with the Soviet Union.

Stalin's

monistic conception of world communism under Soviet domi
nation, however, remained inflexible.

As the crisis

between the leadership of the Communist Parties of the
two nations deepened, the rank and file as well as the
Yugoslav people rallied around its leadership.

The

Cominform resolution which expelled Yugoslavia from the
communist world found the nation's leadership shocked
1o

but not unprepared. °
As time went on, Yugoslav communism became increas
ingly more national.

For one, the Balkan state gained

and retained complete independence from the U.S.S.R.
17"The Soviet - Yugoslav Dispute," reprinted in
George Bilainkin, Tito (New York: Philosophical Library,
1950), p. 237.
-'-^Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York:
Schuster, 1953)? pp* 352-370.

Simon and
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For another, it developed its own ideology, its own pro
cedures and institutions which differed from those of
other communist states.
Communist Internationalism - The Monistic and the
Pluralistic Conception
Two interpretations of world communism developed
after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the communist world:
a monistic conception pronounced by Stalin and a plu
ralistic one advocated by the Yugoslav communists.

Even

though there existed now about a dozen communist states,
Stalin's conception of inter-communist relations had re
mained essentially unchanged from his pre-war position.
He regarded communism as one and indivisible.

Communism

was to be characterized by monolithic unity.

The policy-

line in theory and practice as pronounced by the one
authorized person - Stalin himself - was to be followed
by all communist parties.

The world communist movement

was to be united under the leadership and supervision of
the most important and most advanced communist nation,
namely the U.S.S.R.

There was to be only one path

leading to socialism - the Soviet one - which was to be
traveled by all nations in their quest for socialism.
Proletarian revolutions everywhere were to follow the
Soviet pattern.
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The Yugoslav communists, on the other hand, saw the
communist movement as a house with many mansions.

The

ideology of Marxism would he common to the whole move
ment.

Apart from this, however, each nation should

develop its own brand of socialism and communism free
from Soviet mastery.

In short, each communist country,

according to the Yugoslav conception, should develop its
own road to socialism.

This pluralistic interpretation

of world communism represented an ever present threat to
Stalin's monistic and centralistic view.
As long as Stalin held the reins of government in
the Kremlin, the response to the Yugoslav threat was
conventional.

He insisted that Yugoslavia be disregarded.

Stalin pronounced that only the Soviet Union and the
other Bloc countries were truly socialist and accused
the Yugoslav Communist Party of bourgeois nationalism.
Once Stalin had left the scene, a different and more
flexible approach to the problem of inter-communist
relations became possible.
The Post-Stalin Era
When Krushchev ascended to a leadership position,
the policy of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. proved
to be different than it had been under Stalin.

Two main

occurances marked the beginning of a new era in inter
communist relations.

The first was Mr. Krushchev's and
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Mr. Bulganin's visit to Belgrade where the Soviet leaders
tacitly accepted the Yugoslav doctrine of many roads to
s o c i a l i s m .

^

Following this visit to Belgrade, the

Cominform was dissolved.

The second event that rocked

the communist world was Krushchev's secret speech at the
Twentieth Party Congress in which he openly denounced
the features of Stalinism.
What Krushchev opted for was a more realistic ap
proach to inter-communist relations.

He wanted to rid

the communist world of some of the abuses of Stalinism.
The Kremlin leader tended toward a more liberal Communist
Bloc where each nation could, within limits, adopt a
policy most suited to its conditions.

It seems likely,

however, that Krushchev never intended to grant to the
so-called Soviet satellites independence on the model of
Yugoslavia or Red China.

Rather, he hoped that the

leadership of the communist nations of Eastern Europe
would subordinate themselves voluntarily to Soviet
leadership.

Although he was willing to grant each nation

within the Camp equality of status, he did not neces20
sarily plan to extend equality of function.
•^National Communism and Popular Revolution in
Eastern Europe, ed. Paul E. Zinner (New York:
Columbia
University Press, 1956), p. 6.
2(^H. Gordon Skilling, "Communism: National or
International," International Journal, Vol. XVII
(Winter, 1959-1960), p. 43-
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What the Kremlin leader expected to he a controlled
thaw developed into an uncontrollable flood.

The revo

lutions in Poland and Hungary were its manifestations.
The Soviet intervention

and the crushing of the Hungarian

uprising seemed to mark

the end of the liberal era in the

field of inter-communist relations.

Tito, as the spokes

man of pluralism, bitterly criticized Soviet intervention
in Hungary; as the communist, he reluctantly justified
it.21
Out of this period of relaxation and revolt evolved
a new interpretation of inter-communist relations, which
was made explicit at the Moscow Conference of Communist
Parties in December, 1957Conference attempted to

The statement of the

tighten control and to re

establish communist unity without returning to the pre
vious dogmatic monistic interpretation of communist
internationalism.

Under the new policy, the communist

nations of East Europe were granted some autonomy of
decision but only within the voluntary solidarity of the
Bloc.

Common action of the Bloc was to be maintained,

but a certain degree of policy differences was declared
permissible so that national peculiarities could be taken
into account.
by Moscow.

The boundaries of diversity were to be set

Perhaps one could call this approach to

21Por Tito's Pula Speech on November 11, 1956, see:
National Communism and Popular Revolution in Eastern
Europe, op. cit., pp. 51b-54l.
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inter-communist relations laid down by the Mo s c o w Con
ference one of pluralistic monism.
All communist states, with the exception of Y u g o 
slavia, voluntarily accepted this new pattern of inter
communist relations.

Following the proclamation of this

new policy-line, Yugoslavia was again heavily attacked.
The publication of the Program of the League of Communists
of Yugoslavia did little to better the relationship
between the Balkan nation and the Bloc countries.

In

the early sixties the relations between Yugoslavia and
the Soviet Union became again more cordial.
The pattern laid down by the Moscow Conference
proved to work reasonably well until,

in the early

sixties, Rumania refused to accept its economic assign
ment within COMECON.

Rumania asserted that, according

to the Moscow resolution,

it did not need to accept an

assignment not beneficial to its national interests.
Today the Soviet Bloc is not characterized by com
plete unity.
way.

Within limits each nation goes its separate

The communist parties of the East European states

no longer doggedly accept the dictates of Moscow.
Nevertheless,

as far as broad foreign policy is concerned,

the Soviet Bloc accepts the leadership of Moscow.
Yugoslavia remained the only nation which once a "Soviet
satellite" gained complete independence from Moscow.
policy-line of the Yugoslav communists, as well as the
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The

Yugoslav reforms, might have had some impact upon the
communist countries of the Bloc.

The Yugoslav path of

national communism proves that the existence of a
communist nation completely independent from Soviet
Russia is possible.

Thus, Yugoslavia remains a challenge

to the Soviet conception of pluralistic-monistic inter
communist relations.
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CHAPTER II
THE EVOLUTION OF THE YUGOSLAV SYSTEM
The unique features of the Yugoslav system evolved
after the nation's excommunication from the Communist
Bloc in 1948.

Before this time the communist government

of Yugoslavia closely followed Stalinist doctrine and
practices in the estahlishment of socialism in its
country.

In the immediate post-war years, many outside

observers considered Yugoslavia Stalin's closest ally.
In retrospect it is clear that conflict between the two
Communist Parties existed even during the war years.
Many features which later found their place in the Yugo
slav ideology can be recognized in their embryonic form
as early as the years following the War of Liberation.
The Soviet Yugoslav Conflict
Disagreements between the Yugoslav and the Soviet
communist leadership extend back to the days of 1941.
President Tito said in 1951 that "as early as that, the
Soviet leaders revealed the tendency to steer our whole
uprising . . . in a way that best suited the interests of
the Soviet Union as a state and their Greater Russian
policy."-5- Yet, during the days of the uprising, Moscow
1Dedijer, op. cit., p. 256 .
20
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was for the Yugoslavs "not only a political and spiritual
center but the realization of an abstract ideal - the
'classless society1 - something that not only made their
sacrifice and suffering easy and sweet, but that justified their very existence in their own eyes."

The

Yugoslavs considered at that time that all the diver
gencies between them and the Soviet Union were mere mis
conceptions on the part of their Soviet comrades which
grew out of their lack of knowledge of conditions
existing in Yugoslavia.
The differences that arose between the nations from
19^5 to 1948 were mainly of political nature.

Stalin

later put the issues of the dispute in ideological terms.
At the basis of the Soviet-Yugoslav frictions, however,
a difference of conception regarding the relations be
tween communist parties and states can be detected.
Stalin's principle of socialism in one country as applied
to the international sphere clashed with the Yugoslav
view that "our first duty is to look after our own
c o u n t r y . Stalin attempted to control the Yugoslav

government and the Yugoslav Party by various economic
and political measures.

York:

The Yugoslav communists,

2Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.), 1982, p. 11.
^Ibid., p . 10.
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however, wished to maintain the nation's and the Party's
independence and identity.
In the economic field the Soviet Union was not much
interested in Yugoslavia's developing heavy industry nor
in helping it to do so.

Heavy industry was, however, in

the Stalinist view, the basis for the industrialization
of a country and for the development of socialist rela
tions.

The Yugoslavs who at that time adhered to this

view proclaimed a far reaching industrialization program
of their own.
Friction between the two governments also arose over
the establishment of mixed companies which had been insti
tuted in most of the other Soviet Bloc countries.

The

controlling interest in these companies was usually
Soviet while the recipient of the "aid" put forth the
bulk of the capital.^

When the Yugoslavs brought these

matters to Stalin's attention, he usually conceded to
their demands acknowledging reluctantly Yugoslavia's
special status within the Bloc.
Serious friction between the governments of the two
nations arose over the status of the Soviet "advisers^"
many of whom were connected with the Soviet secret police
These "advisers" did not approach the government or party
leaders for the information they wished to gain, i.e.,
2i
Dedijer, _ojp. cit., p. 269 .
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they did not use the official channels of information "but
requested it from any official along the line.

The

Yugoslav leaders resented this snooping in their inter
nal business and placed the offenders under supervision.
With these and similar methods, the Yugoslav communists
asserted their national integrity and independence.

The

Soviet leadership did not treat these assertions with
much humor;

more so because it realized that

East European communists began to resent

the other

the special

treatment and the concessions the Soviets made to the
Yugoslavs.
Although these incidents formed much of the substan
tive material of the break, the final cause seems to have
evolved around the ultimate organization of East Europe.
The idea of consolidating the East European states into
new entities is not a novel one.

The otherwise economi

cally and military non-viable states could by means
of federation or confederation solve these and other
problems.
During the years following the war,
were talked about in communist circles.

two federations
One was to in

clude Poland and Czechoslovakia; the other, Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania.^-

The latter federation,

in all likelihood, would have been led by the Yugoslav
Communist Party due to the Party's strength and unity,
^Ibid., p. 313.
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as well as the prestige its leaders had gained throughout
the area.

In fact, Marshall Tito was at that time the

second most prominent figure in the communist world and
the only communist leader who could rival Stalin in.
"popularity."
Stalin realized that a federation between Bulgaria,
Rumania, Albania and Yugoslavia under the latter's
leadership could lead to a second center of gravity in
the Communist Bloc.

Due to his obsession for absolute

unity, Stalin could not allow this to happen.

To fore

stall the rise of the much dreaded policentrism, Stalin
proposed - and his proposals were orders - an immediated
federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as well as the
merging of the two Parties.

The Bulgarian communist

leadership had always faithfully followed Stalin's
orders.

By combining the two political organizations,

Stalin would have succeeded in weakening the Yugoslav
Party considerably.

The Yugoslav communists realized

this danger and rejected the proposal arguing that a
federation between two established states and parties
should be a slow process.^
Following the Yugoslav rejection of the proposal,
Stalin ordered the withdrawal of all military advisers
from the Balkan nation.

Through this and similar

6Ibid., p. 328 .
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measures he hoped to pressure the Yugoslav communists
into conforming to his wishes.

Furthermore, by with

drawing his recognition of Tito, the Kremlin leader
hoped to isolate the latter from his party and make pos
sible a take-over by the pro-Stalinist wing.

After

these attempts failed Stalin decided to isolate Yugo
slavia from the communist world by repudiating Tito and
his followers.

The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the

Communist Bloc could only be effected on ideological
grounds; in order to be deserving of excommunication,
Tito had to be accused of heresy against fundamental
doctrine.
The ideological as well as the political charges
were brought against Yugoslavia in an exchange of letters
between the Central Committees of the two Parties.^

The

first Soviet letter, which was an answer to the Yugoslav
note concerning the withdrawal of the Soviet advisers,
was extraordinarily crude and commanding in tone.

It

began with the words:

"We consider your answer untrue
O
and, therefore, utterly unsatisfactory."
Many of the
ideological accusations hurled against Yugoslavia were
fabricated.
^For the exchange of letters between the Central
Committees of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia see "The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute,"
op. cit., pp. 225- 287 .
Q
The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute," op. cit., p. 232.
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For one, the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) was
charged with the absence of inner-party democracy as
well as self-criticism.

In addition the Soviet

communists accused the Yugoslavs of co-opting rather than
electing members into the Central Committee.

Even if

these charges were true, the Soviet Party could hardly
be classified as a model of democracy.

Co-option into

the higher organs of the party apparatus had been per
fected by Stalin himself.
Furthermore, the Soviet communists contended that
the Yugoslav communist leadership had deprived the Party
of its role as the leading force in Yugoslavia by merging
it with the People's Front.
with the facts.

This again did not coincide

The YCP never merged with any other

party, as did the communist parties of Eastern Europe,
nor was it dominated by the People's Front; rather, the
opposite was true.
The Yugoslav leadership was further accused of
reintroducing the capitalist order into the villages.
Yet, Yugoslavia was at that time the communist country
that had carried out the collectivization of agriculture
to the furthest degree in Eastern Europe.
On top of all these accusations, the Soviet letter
classified most of the Yugoslav leaders as dubious
Marxists and attempted to threaten them into compliance
by recalling the case of Trotsky.
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One should not disdain to recall that Trotsky.,
when he Intended to declare war on the A.-U.C.P.
(B), also began by accusing the A.-U.C.P. (B),
of decadence, of limited national spirit, of
Great Power chauvinism . . . Nevertheless, as
is known, Trotsky himself was a degenerate and
afterwards, once he had been proven for what
he was, he openly joined the camp of the sworn
enemies of the A.-U.C.P. (B) and the Soviet
Union.
We imagine that the political career of
Trotsky is sufficiently instructive.-^
The Soviet charges were discussed in a Central Com
mittee meeting of the YCP which rejected the Soviet
letter and its accusations.

In the words of Tito ,10

it would have been contemptible to accept the letter
because the accusations were untrue.

He added:

"We

are entitled to speak on an equal footing with the Soviet
Union."

Furthermore, Tito was of the opinion that the

charges had to be rejected because the Yugoslav people
would not stand by a leadership that proved unworthy of
the people's sacrifices during the War of Liberation.
Again, he put his country above the Soviet Union when he
stated:
Comrades, our revolution does not devour its
children. The children of this revolution
are honest . . . No one has the right to
love his country less than the Soviet Union.
That is treason.
^ Ibid.

10Dedijer, ojo. cit., p. 242.
1XIbid.
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From Tito's comments it became obvious that Stalin could
not build his monolithic empire with Yugoslavia.

So that

unity in the rest of the Bloc could be maintained, Yugo
slavia had to be excluded from the communist world.

To

the Soviet Union the loss of Yugoslavia was bitter, but
to Stalin it appeared to be the lesser of two evils.

In

the interest of a monolithic Soviet Bloc, the sacrifice
was made.
The charges against Yugoslavia grew increasingly
worse as the YCP refused to take the proper attitude
toward Soviet criticism, i.e. to accept it.

These accu

sations were the prelude to the nation's excommunication
from the Cominform on June 28, 1948.
From 1948 Onward - Decentralization,
The New Formula
For an innitial period following the break with
Moscow, the struggle for survival consumed all the ener
gies of the Yugoslav government.

The Yugoslav communist

leadership needed the loyalty of the whole nation to over
come the crisis and to forego a coup within the Party.
Another problem that had to be coped with was the ex
tremely serious economic and financial situation that the
country faced after the Soviet Union and the other Bloc
countries withdrew aid and advisers in addition to can
celling all trade agreements.

The Yugoslav Communist
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Party reacted to these difficulties with reforms designed
to pacify the discontented non-communist element in the
country.

The regime also sought cooperation with the

Western capitalist nations in order to overcome the
nation’s economic difficulties.
The years, 19^8 and 19^9, were a waiting period in
which the Yugoslav communists hoped to be readmitted into
the fold, while the Soviet communists still thought that
their economic and military maneuvers might overthrow
Tito and his followers.

By 1950 the battle-lines were

clearly drawn, and both factions knew that they would have
to live with the rift in the communist world.
The reforms that had been and were to be instituted
centered around the idea of decentralization.

Ideo

logically, decentralization was justified by the Yugo
slavs as a step further in the direction of the Marxian
thesis predicting the withering away of the state.
Yugoslavia proclaimed itself a leader in advancing the
disappearance of government and thereby claimed a place
ahead of the Soviet Union in terms of the stage of
socialism achieved.

1P

-^Charles P. McVicker, Titoism: Pattern for International Communism (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1957) 5 PP. 137-139.
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Decentralization of the Party
The organization of the Yugoslav Communist Party
was originally patterned after the Soviet counterpart
with strong central control and direction.

In the early

1950's the Yugoslav communists asserted that, if the state
were to wither away, the Party had to do likewise.

This

meant a change in the position of the party membership
and of the Party's task.

It also meant the decentrali

zation of its functions and of its administrative
apparatus.
One of the first measures that were taken in this
direction was the relaxation of democratic centralism.

11

Furthermore, the special privileges of party members
were abolished.

The Yugoslav communists were reminded

that their legal position was the same as that of other
Yugoslav citizens.
Prior to the decentralization movement, membership
in the Communist Party was termed a private and secret
matter.

The members of the Party were urged to play

their roles incognito and be the eyes and ears of the
regime in all phases of life.

The effort of broadening

the base of Yugoslavs who would play a role in the
governing of the country did not support this concept of
13jpred Warner Neal, Titoism in Action: The Reforms
in Yugoslavia after 1948 (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1958), p. 79-
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the Party.

The role of the party membership was now

directed toward the task of educating and propogandizing
the masses, i.e. it was to he active in hacking Party
and governmental programs to the hroad public.

A greater

amount of autonomy was delegated to the grass root levels
of the Party.

The party apparatus was reduced consider

ably, and many of its functions were turned over to the
Socialist Alliance.
To provide the Party with a new start, it was re
named the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in November,
1952.

Prom 1948 to 1952 the Party's membership increased

by 70 per cent.

ill

The delegation of various functions to the People's
Front which were formerly carried out by the Party meant
a greater reliance on this broader political organization,
which was renamed the Socialist Alliance of the Working
People of Yugoslavia.

Mr. Edvard Kardelj ^ defined the

functions of the Socialist Alliance as follows:
1) It is becoming a mass public platform of
socialist policy and thought, an organiza
tional form of unhampered exchange of views
upon a general socialist platform;
■^ Walter Hildebrandt, "Die Innenpolitische Abwendung
vom Stalinismus nach dem Kominformkonlikt, 1948-1953,."
Jugoslavien, ed. Werner Markert (Koln Graz: Bohlau
Verlag, 1954), p. 142.
■^Edvard Kardelj, "The Role of the Socialist
Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia," Report to
the Fourth Congress of the People's Front, Yugoslav
Review, Vol. II (March-April, 1953), P- if*
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2) It should be a political foundation for all
state and social self-governing bodies; in
extensive discussion and criticism these
bodies will here be under the supervision
of the masses;
3) It should be sufficiently broad in its
political platform so as to enable the parti
cipation in it of every citizen who comports
himself honorably towards the social commu
nity and accepts the general aims of social
ism - regardless of ideological or other
differences in opinion;
4) With its methods of work, it should func
tion as an all-national parliament which is
constantly in session, in which every well
intended citizen may always advance his views,
his proposals and his criticism on any
question of socialist life.
Within this organization the communists were to maintain
the leading positions.

They were to influence and guide

the Socialist Alliance as individuals rather than domi
nate it through their status as members of the Communist
Party.
Although the Party's tasks had been changed and its
organization decentralized so as to be in harmony with
the ultimate withering away of the organization, it was
maintained that the Party must retain its leading posi
tion in society as well as its purity and unity.

These

somewhat contradictory views resulted in confusion within
the ranks of the Party.

The party leadership decided to

check this confusion by tightening party discipline and
by putting a greater emphasis on democratic centralism.
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Milovan Djilas, a leading communist, rejected this
new tendency and set out to write a number of articles
in Borba.

These articles contained ideas which no other

party leader had ever before publicly expressed.

Djilas

argued that the Party was no longer necessary in
Yugoslavia.

In addition he stated in his article dated

December 6 , 1953; that
. . . the goal of communism is too distant
to be meaningful . . . but that the goal
today is the increasing rapid and painless
progress of socialism and democracy through
concrete, realizable goals and not goals^
like communism and things of that sort .1(3
Furthermore, Djilas continued his attack against bureau
cratism which was climaxed by a bitter and satirical
article against the inner circles of party bureaucrats
with obvious reference to a prominent Yugoslav
communist
Djilas' ideas, which did not coincide with the offi
cial party-line, added further confusion to the already
confused rank and file.

They had to be checked in order

to maintain unity in the Party.

Milovan Djilas was not

willing to change his views and was stripped of his party
posts.

Later he resigned his party membership.

-^Milovan Djilas, Anatomy of a Moral; The Political
Essays of Milovan Djilas (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1959)a p. 7<3■^For the article see Ibid., pp. 145-176.
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After the Djilas affair party discipline received
still greater emphasis.

Moves were made to strengthen

the Party's control over the economy and social insti
tutions.

This, however, was achieved through communists

working through the unions, the Socialist Alliance and
the government hodies rather than through direct control
"by the party apparatus.

The communist power position

remained intact although the Party had keen decentralized.
Decentralization in the economic and government spheres
Decentralization in the economic sphere was first
instituted in 1950 with the establishment of the workers'
councils.
by workers.

The councils were elected in all enterprises
In turn they set up the management board

of three to eleven members.

The management board acts

as the executive committee of the workers' council and
is responsible to it.

The executive committee of the

council, in turn, appoints the plant manager.
The workers' councils do much of the planning of the
enterprise.

Within the limits set down by law and the

federal plan, these councils determine what is to be pro
duced and how much; they set the prices and wages and
determine the investment.

They also have the authority

to dispose of their net profit as they see fit.

A cer

tain degree of control is exercised over these bodies
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through the individual communist who is a me m b e r of the
workers' councils and through trade union organizations.
The various federal planning agencies., which until
1950 directed the Yugoslav economy, were progressively
abolished until the Federal Planning Institute became
little more than a data compiling agency.

A federal plan

still exists, but it has no binding authority.

The

government controls the planning of the workers' councils
only so far as it fixes the "basic proportions" according
to which each factor of production should be rewarded in
wages, investments, etc.

"1ft

The Fundamental Law of 1953 integrated the workers'
councils into a comprehensive structure which was de
signed to give the "working organizations" representation
on all levels of government.

On the federal level this

was accomplished by adding the Federal Council of
Producers to the Federal Assembly.

The membership of

the Council of Nationalities was merged with the Federal
Council and retained the latter's name.

The Federal

Council of Producers became the upper chamber of the
Assembly.

Comparable reorganization took place on all

levels of government.
The Federal Council was composed of deputies elected
by the citizens in the districts and towns on the basis
^Neal, op. cit., p. 128 .
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of universal and equal suffrage and of P e o p l e ’s Deputies
elected from amongst the members of the respective
Republic Councils of the respective assemblies and of
the respective bodies in the autonomous regions.

19

The

Federal Council of Producers was elected b y means of a
complicated electoral system in which the w o r k e r s ’ coun
cils elected representatives to the next higher body.
Thus, the regional Producers'
tives to Republic Councils,

Councils sent representa

and these in turn elected

the Federal Council of Producers.

The deputies to the

Council of Producers were elected as representatives of
their economic units by the workers and employees of the
economic enterprise and b y members of agricultural
cooperatives as well as by craftsmen and handi-craft
workers.

Of)

Each production group is represented in the

Council of Producers in proportion to its contribution
to total social product of the nation.

21

The organization of the Federal Assembly was changed
considerably by the Constitution of 1963*

On the federal

level the Council of Producers was abolished and a pentacameral legislature was established.

The Federal

^ T h e Ne w Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia ( Belgrade:
Union of Jurist's Association, 1 953)a Art. 25•
^ I b i d ., Art.

28.

^ E d v a r d Kardelj, "The New Social and Political
System of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia,"
in The New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia, o p . c i t .,
p. 33-
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Assembly comprises the Federal Chamber
. . . as a chamber of delegates of the citi
zens in the communes and republics., the Economic
Chamber, the Chamber of Education and Culture,
the Chamber of Welfare and Health, and the
Organizational-Political Chamber as chambers
of delegates of the working people in the
working communities .22
The election and composition of the Federal Chamber
remained essentially the same.

The chambers which repre

sent working communities are elected by the Communal
Assemblies.

Elegibility for election to these chambers
23
is determined by the Constitution.

Reforms in local government
A series of laws since 19^8 reorganized the local
government in Yugoslavia and gave it increased autonomy.
As instituted by the Fundamental Law, the People1s
Committees became the basic organs of state authority.
They represented the highest organs of state authority
in the municipality, town and district.

Committees at

the latter two levels were bicameral bodies, each com
posed of a General Council and a Council of Producers.
The Constitution of 1963 set down the commune as the
basic social-political community.

By the concept of the

22The Constitution of the Socialist Federal People's
Republic of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Union of Jurist's
Association, 1964), Ar t . 165 .

2^Ibid., Art. 168.
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commune is understood "a specific self-government of an
economically integrated territory.

It indicates the pro-

cess of consolidation of local communities."

24

The

Communal Assembly which constitutes the governing body
of this unit is a bicameral organ comprised of the
Communal Chamber and the Chamber of Working Communities.
Members to the former are elected directly by the citizens
of the c o m m u n e m e m b e r s to the latter are chosen by the
working people engaged in working organizations, state
organs., social-political organizations and associations
by the farmer members of the cooperatives and other
working organizations.
The communal governing bodies have become a major
source of administrative control.

They are the basic

administrative units for police and security activities
except, of course, the secret police.

Investment has

become more and more the responsibility of these bodies.
Through their authority to levy taxes, the communal
governing organs have some power to regulate the
enterprises.
Again, the. League of Communists exercises indirect,
though adequate, control over the local governing bodies
2^Radovoje Petkovic, Local Self-Government in
Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Publicity and Publishing Enter
prise Jugoslavija, 1955)j P* T2.
2^The Constitution of the Federal People's
Republic . . ., ojo. cit., Art. 76 .
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through its individual members.

However, the local level

of government does exercise a considerable amount of
authority and gives evidence of independent action.
Decentralization in agriculture
Decentralization was also carried out in the field
of agriculture.

After 1951 the regime openly conceded

that the farmers were not satisfied with the collective
system.

When a reconciliation with the Soviet Union

seemed out of the question, the Yugoslav regime needed
the loyalty of this numerically most important segment
of the population and thus had to make corresponding
concessions.

In 1951, following a crisis in agriculture,

the government ushered in a more cautious policy.

The

regime first decided to dissolve the unprofitable col
lective farms, which affected about one-third of the
QfZ

Yugoslav farmers.

The year, 1952, saw the further

reduction of the collective farms 3 and by the spring of

1953 a- government decree spelled out, for all practical
purposes, the end of collectivization of agriculture in
Yugoslavia . ^

The government called the farmers to form

cooperatives on a voluntary basis.

The maximum of indi

vidual landholdings had been restricted to ten hectares
p

6

Neal, o£. cit., p. 192.

2^The Law of March 28, 1953*
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and that of family farms to fifteen hectares.

Despite

their very small landholdings which averaged three to
four hectares the peasants preferred to strike out on
their own.

Within a year about 1,000 of the 6,904 col-

lective farms were still in existence. 28
Relaxation of the totalitarian features
After the Gominform break Yugoslavia was characterized
by the doctrine and the practice of decentralization, as
well as by a relaxation of the totalitarian features of
the regime.

The activities of the secret police were

curbed as were its powers.

Furthermore, legal guarantees

for the accused were devised, and an increase in the
independence of the courts became observable.

Although

all attempts to establish a multi-party system have come
to naught, non-party candidates are allowed to run for
office although they are seldom successful.

The govern

ment has indicated its willingness to pursue a live-andlet-live policy toward the churches as long as the clergy
keeps away from political matters.

However, the regime

has not altered its official policy of opposition to
religion.
The Djilas affair showed the extent of this relaxa
tion as well as its limits.

The treatment Djilas

^®Neal, op. ci t ., p. 191 and p. 210 .
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received for his "heretical" views was extremely mild
when compared with that previously accorded to individuals
for similar transgressions.

After the publication of

his articles in Borba, which included ideas out of har
mony with the official party-line 3 Milovan Djilas was
expelled from the Central Committee but was permitted
to maintain his party membership which he later resigned.
Only after he further antagonized the communist leader
ship by giving an interview to the Dew York Times,in
which he advocated a two-party system and claimed that
there existed no freedom of discussion in the Party.,

29

did he receive a suspended eighteen-month prison sen
tence.

Djilas, however^ did not cease to embarrass

the regime and was finally made to serve a three-year
sentence after criticizing Tito's stand concerning the
Hungarian revolution in an article published in the
New

L e a d e r .3 1

Had Milovan Djilas not dared his erst

while comrades, he might have been permitted to lead a
reasonably free life and might have been assigned a non
political position as was his former associate^
Vladimir Dedijer.
^ T h e New York Times, December 25, 195^-, P* 13°The New York Times, January 25, 1955, P- 1*
•^The New York Times, December 14, 1956, p. 1.
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The totalitarian aspects of the regime were reduced
"but not to the extent of bringing the state of freedom
to par with that enjoyed by the citizens of the
Western countries.
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CHAPTER III
THE YUGOSLAV IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
After Yugoslavia's excommunication from the Cominform, it became necessary for the Yugoslav communists to
abolish those features of the system that were most ob
noxious to the population in order to gain or maintain'
if not its support at least its toleration.

The serious

economic and financial difficulties that Yugoslavia
faced after its separation from the Communist Bloc made
qualified cooperation with the Western nations necessary.
Due to the fact that in a communist system all
important moves require ideological qualification,, the
Yugoslav policy had to be justified ideologically in
accordance with Marxian., and to a certain extent,
Leninist principles.

The Yugoslav ideological frame

work had to explain the Yugoslav position vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union.

It had to provide legitimization for the

internal reforms as well as for the Yugoslav policy
toward the Western capitalist nations.
The Yugoslav ideology is, as is the case with most
modern socialist thought, deeply rooted in Marxism.

This

is true of historic analysis, ultimate goals, the method
of reasoning and the concept of man.

It involves such

concepts as materialism, the law of capitalist development
43
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and the inevitability of the triumph of communism.

In

these factors the Yugoslav framework differs little from
the Soviet model.
As far as the final goal of the League of
Communists is concerned, the Draft Program
. . . proceeds from the scientific premise
that the final disappearance of capitalism
and its vestiges from history is inevitable
for society to undergo a revolutionary trans
fer to socialist relationships, to gradual and
continual development of the latter toward
higher forms until the achievement of
Communism, as a form of relationship among
people where, on the basis of highly devel
oped productive forces every one works
according to his ability and receives
according to his needs. This historical
evolution of society simultaneously is
the final aim of the ideological, politic
cal and economic activity of Communists.
Yugoslav ideologues also incorporated into the new
ideological framework theories advanced by Lenin^ but,
contrary to the Soviet case where Marxist theory and
Leninist doctrine came to form a single doctrine Marxism-Leninism, the Yugoslavs have incorporated into
their theory only part of Lenin's teachings.

Much of

Lenin's contributions to Marxist theory were concerned
with ways and means of establishing socialism in Russia.
Some of these doctrines have been repudiated or recast
in Belgrade.

It is primarily in the realm of interpre

tation of the original Marxist text and of operational
■^Edvard Kardelj, On the Program of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia, A Report to the Seventh
Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia,
Yugoslav Pacts and Views, No. 51 (New York: Yugoslav
Information Center, 1958), p. 1.
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t h e o r y t h a t th e Y u g o s la v id e o lo g y d i f f e r s

fro m i t s

S o v ie t m o d e l.
The Pragmatic and Negative Character of
Yugoslav Ideology
The new Yugoslav theories emerged slowly.

As the

hope for a detente with the Soviet Union decreased, the
Yugoslavs had to build a workable system; workable with
out the powerful backing and approval of the Soviet
Union.

This new system had to be justified ideologically.

For a long time the Yugoslavs expressed what they
were against, rather than what they were for.

The neces

sity to find new approaches and the Yugoslav criticisms
of Soviet theory and practice resulted in the develop
ment of a set of doctrine which in turn acted as the
basis for new reforms.

Given this development it is not

surprising that the theoretical framework came to have
a highly pragmatic character.

The Program of the League

of Communists declares to this effect:
Marxism is not a doctrine established forever
or a system of dogmas. Marxism is a theory
of the social process which develops through
successive historic phases. Marxism there
fore implies a creative application of the
theory and its further development, primarily
by drawing general conclusions from the prac
tice of socialist development and through at
tainments of scientific thinking of mankind.
O
Yugoslavia's Way, op. cit., p. 133•
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S o v ie t m o d e l.

The Pragmatic and Negative Character of
Yugoslav Ideology

The new Yugoslav theories emerged slowly.

As the

hope for a detente with the Soviet Union decreased,

the

Yugoslavs had to build a workable system; workable with
out the powerful backing and approval of the Soviet
Union.

This new system had to be justified ideologically.

For a long time the Yugoslavs expressed what they
were against,

rather than what they were for.

The n e c e s 

sity to find new approaches and the Yugoslav criticisms
of Soviet theory and practice resulted in the develop
ment of a set of doctrine which in turn acted as the
basis for new reforms.

Given this development it is not

surprising that the theoretical framework came to have
a highly pragmatic character.

The Program of the League

of Communists declares to this effect:
Marxism is not a doctrine established forever
or a system of dogmas.
Marxism is a theory
of the social process which develops through
successive historic phases.
Mar x i s m t here
fore implies a creative application of the
theory and its further development, primarily
by drawing general conclusions from the p r a c 
tice of socialist development and through a t 
tainments of scientific thinking of mankind.
O

Yugoslavia's Way,

op. c i t ., p. 133-
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As justification for this opinion^ the Program cites
Lenin approvingly as follows:
We do not at all look on Marx's theory as
something finished . . . We do not pretend
that Marx or Marxists know the road to
socialism in all its concrete aspects.
This is nonsense. We know the direction
of that road, and we know which class
forces lead the way^ hut concretely5 prac
tically 5 only experience of millions will
tellj when they get down to work.3
Due to the pragmatic character of the ideology,, the
Yugoslav system is. in constant flux.

Although it is

stated in the introduction to the Program of the League
of Yugoslav Communists that this document is the founda
tion for future activity and strugglea it goes on to
state that due to the fact that practice is regarded as
the final judge of the correctness of theoretical propo
sitionsj the Yugoslavs will change those features that
practice designates as obsolete or untenable.

ll

The Yugoslav communists had always considered them
selves true disciples of Marx and Lenin.

The only

explanation for their expulsion from the Communist Bloc
was that Stalin himself had deviated from the true path
of Marxist and Leninist theory and that the Yugoslavs
were the true heirs of the "founding fathers" of
scientific socialism.

The next step the Yugoslav

3Ibid.
4
Ibid., pp. xxi-xxii.
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ideologues undertook was to determine where the Soviet
errors lay, where the Soviet Party had deviated from
the principles of Marx, and to rectify these errors in
Yugoslavia.
The Yugoslav leaders acknowledge the debt of all
socialist movements to the October Revolution.

Yet,

since that time and especially since the time of Lenin,
the Soviet communists have strayed from the true path;
bureaucratism and centralism were the two snares in which
the Soviet Union became entangled.

Whereas the early

crises made the concentration of power in the hands of
the state and the Party necessary, this concentration
of power grew at an increasing tempo even though the
situation had changed.

Ultimately, it became institu

tionalized in the Soviet forms of bureaucratism and
centralism.

The state apparatus succumbed to self-

aggrandizement, and the links with the working people
were broken.
Connected with bureaucratism and stateism, so argue
the Yugoslav communists, are tendencies toward ideolo
gical monopoly which attempt to turn Marxist thinking
into a static list of dogmas and abstract verities accom
modating the transient needs of one country.
The Yugoslav leadership argued that bureaucratism
and stateism, which were perfected under Stalin, and the
other evils that followed in their trail were contrary to

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Marx's teachings.

According to Marx, the power of the

state is to be at its highest during the period follow
ing the revolution.

However, according to the Yugoslav

communists, Marx did not intend this period to last past
the expropriation of the expropriators and the national
ization of the means of production.

As soon as these

things were accomplished, the state was to "wither
away."

Yet, Stalin insisted that the power of the state

would increasingly grow in strength until there did not
exist any hindering circumstances for the achievement of
socialism and communism, both nationally and inter
nationally.

Simultaneously with the attainment of com

munism, so contended Stalin, the state would disappear.
This, so believe the Yugoslavs, is a fatal departure
from Marx's theory.
On and around this criticism and their insistence
on independence and equality, both as a nation and a
party, the Yugoslav communist theoreticians built an
ideology which embodies certain unique characteristics.
Different Approaches to Socialism
The Yugoslav ideological framework had to justify,
above all, the Yugoslav insistence that different roads
to socialism were a valid deduction from Marxist and
Leninist theory and that Stalin, in his quest for mono
lithic unity in theory and practice throughout the
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communist worlds had deviated from the true path.
had proven that capitalism develops unevenly.

Lenin

This., so

contend the Yugoslavs, is also the case in the develop
ment of socialism.

Conditions,

traditions and political

situations within any given national unit necessitate
corresponding approaches.
The contemporary development of the brief
but very rich and instructive struggle for
socialism shows that the paths of the working
people to power and socialism are different ;
different not only in different countries but
also in different periods.
This also depends
on the general social conditions, the historic
- - background and political traditions in each
particular country, and on the concrete
economic and social position and concepts of
the working class and working people in
g e n e r a l .5
Tendencies toward ideological monopoly, according to the
Yugoslav leadership, have always been a hinderance to
the advancement of communism.

The correctness of an

ideology or of certain forms of socialist construction,
so the Yugoslav leaders hold,

depend solely upon their

vitality and upon verification by practice but not upon
the approval of an international forum.
The Yugoslavs agree that, as long as there existed
only one socialist nation, Soviet Russia, all other
national communist parties had the responsibility to sup
port this nation and its regime to the best of their
ability.

After the establishment of different socialist

5i b i d ., p. 140.
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nations led by communist governments, however, the p r i 
mary responsibility of the communist parties concerned
was to be towards its own people and its specific
strivings and needs,

rather than toward the Soviet

Union and its ambitions.
The Yugoslav communists criticized and repudiated
Stalin's doctrine of socialism in one country as applied
to the international sphere.

This doctrine was used to

achieve and maintain ideological unity of action within
the communist world by imposting Stalin's ideological
interpretations upon other communist parties and by
directing their actions in the best interest of the
Soviet Union.
The Yugoslav leadership contends that in order to
ensure the most successful development of any given
country the communist party of the nation concerned must
take into account the specific internal conditions of
that country.

Different practices will result in

different nations.

This, however,

does not represent

a contradiction to proletarian internationalism.

In

the words of President Tito,

^Josip Broz Tito, "The Role of the League of
Communists in the Further Development of Socialist
Social Relations and Current Problems in the Inter
national Workers Movement and in the Struggle for Peace
and Socialism in the World," Practice and Theory of
Socialist Development in Yugos l a v i a , VIII Congress of
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Belgrade:
Medunarodna Politica, 1965 )j p. 27*
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. . . internationalism does not start where
autonomy and independence end. Real revolu
tionary unity and socialist solidarity must
be based on such a community of interests
and views as arises from the full indepen
dence and responsibility of each party.
Today, more than ever before, the inter
national workers' movement needs such unity
as does not conceal differences; but, on
the contrary, recognized them. After all,
total unity in the international workers'
movement has never existed.'
The goals of socialism, so argue the Belgrade theoreti
cians, are the same in every country.

Yet, for a variety

of reasons, various nations achieve them in different
ways.

The experience of the socialist forces in one

country becomes the experience of the international
workers' movement as a whole.

Due to this fact the

experiences of one country are shared with that of all
other nations.

This strengthens the socialist forces in

the world and will influence each particular country in
its further development toward socialism.
The Yugoslav concept of proletarian internationalism
means solidarity between equal socialist nations each
walking its own chosen path toward socialism.

This

interpretation is contrary to Stalin's conception of
internationalism which required unity within the Communist
Camp under the leadership of one party which was com
mitted to the interest of one country, the Soviet Union.
7Ibid.

R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The exchange of experience and. the cooperation
between the different communist parties can, so state
the Yugoslavs, be carried out in both bi-lateral and
multi-lateral agreements provided these agreements are
always based upon full equality, with no imposition of
attitudes and no interference in the internal affair of
the parties concerned.

This cooperation is to be in the

interest of both peace and socialism.
Proletarian internationalism, as defined in the
Program of the League of Yugoslav

C o m m u n i s t s ,^

distinct yet interconnected meanings.

has three

First of all, it

connotates the determination of the labor movement to
develop in its respective countries a persistent struggle
for socialism and the daily interest of the working
people; to prepare for taking over power and to be
ready for the construction of socialism in accordance
with the interests of the working people of the world.
Secondly, the principle implies the responsibility of
the communist parties and governments to support the
struggle for socialism in all other countries; and
thirdly, when applied to Yugoslavia, the concept of pro
letarian internationalism demands the communists to work
for the strengthening of the brotherhood amongst the
Yugoslav peoples and to provide for their equality as
well as their material and cultural progress.
Q
Yugoslavia1s Way, op. cit., pp. 66-67-
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The Transition from Capitalism to Proletarian
Socialism and Its Implications

The Yugoslavs accept Lenin's theory concerning the
further development of capitalism during the imperialist
phase.

Yet;

they maintain that the capitalist social

system in its classical form belongs to the past.

They

argue that capitalist governments have, by interfering
with the economy,
Social security,

changed the nature of capitalism.
government control of business and labor

unions are manifestations of this tendency.
The capitalist social system in its classic
form belongs to the past.
In the period of
free competition, capitalism developed p r o 
ductive forces and techniques of production;
but at the same time it created conditions
and forces which in one way or another
exerted a growing pressure upon it, sharp
ened its internal contradictions and
demanded its change as a s y s t e m . 5
Today all forms of capitalism embody a number of social
ist tendencies as well as socialist forms.

Pure

capitalism does not exist, nor can there be found pure
socialism because,

so the Yugoslavs argue,

social

systems do never appear in pure form.
Contemporary socialism is not and cannot be
homogeneous.
Vestiges of the old system
intermingle and laws of commodity production
operate in it.
Certain contradictions and

9l b i d .,

p.

11.
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antagonisms of the last phase of capitalism
are carried over into the" first phase of the
construction of the socialist society. 0
Due to the fact that capitalism embodies socialist te n 
dencies and forms and socialism contains certain charac
teristics of capitalism,

a peaceful transition from one

social system to the other is under certain conditions
feasible.
The working class has forged its way as the
leading social force both in sharp revolu
tionary and anti-imperialist conflicts and
in parliamentary and other relatively pea c e 
ful forms of struggle.
While under certain
conditions the working class through evolu
tionary action razes the old system to its
foundations, under some other it is willing
or compelled to compromise to accept mutual ^
concessions to be content with reforms . . .
The working class will become in certain
countries and under certain conditions
the leading force in society by means of a
relatively peaceful struggle . . . ensuring
. . . the birth and growth of socialism. ^
The Yugoslav Communists thus repudiated the Soviet
opinion that the transition from capitalism to socialism
can only come about through a violent revolutionary
struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
The Yugoslavs have justified their argument by citing
various statements of Karl Marx, who also thought a

10I b i d ., p. 24.
~^ I b i d ., p. 3 6 1 ? I b i d ., p. 3 8 .
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peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism under
certain circumstances possible, although not likely.
In Belgrade it is believed that although there
exists a fundamental conflict between the two social
systems, this conflict does not have to take the form
of a violent struggle between nations.
In the present day attitude toward social
and political events in the world, one cannot
overlook the fact that the differences in
social systems and ideological concepts are
the result of an inevitable development of
society, that they are an expression of already
existing relations and, thus, represent the
conditions for society's further progress.
It
is illusory then to consider that these
differences may be solved by military means.
At this particular stage of historic development, wars
between nations adhering to different ideologies are
no longer inevitable.

This does not, as the Yugoslavs

contest, refute the Leninist thesis that imperialism
gives birth to wars and crises but rather that the power
and the role of the imperialist factors have weakened,
especially when compared to the development of the
socialist forces.

Furthermore, in the days of nuclear

weaponry, a war might prove to be the destruction of
mankind and would thus be in the interest of neither
system.
Alexander Rankovie, An Address to the Veteran's
Congress, June 29, 1961 , Yugoslav Facts and Views,
No. 127 (New York: Yugoslav Information Center, 1961),
p. 1 .
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Peaceful coexistence
In order to avoid the disaster of a nuclear war,
so the Yugoslavs insist, peaceful coexistence between
all countries, regardless of their social system or ideology, becomes necessary.

The principle of coexistence

should not mean the
. . . living of peoples and states side by
side, but rather . . . international rela
tions based on completely new modern princi
ples, enabling lively peaceful activities
between states with different social
systems.
Hence, this policy is not identical with the traditional
concept of neutralism.

Neutralism, by keeping aloof,

does not seek to reduce tensions in international
affairs; whereas active cooperation is an idea of uni
versalism opposed to all withdrawal into isolation. lb
J
In the words of President Tito:
Only the policy of coexistence is by its
very nature, although this is not always
understood and active policy, it is a poli
cy of active and constructive international
cooperation with a view of finding ways and
•^Josip Broz Tito, "The Building of Socialism and
the Role and Task of the Socialist Alliance of the
Working People of Yugoslavia," A Report to the Fifth
Congress of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People
of Yugoslavia, Review of International Affairs, Vol. XI
(April 16, i960 ), p. 61
1^Jovan Djordjevic, "Philosophical and Sociological
Basis of Coexistence," Review of International Affairs,
Vol. VII (August 1, 1956), p. 15.
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means for settling all outstanding international
problems and eliminating the sources of inter
national tensions.
Only active cooperation, so insists Edvard Kardelj, will
make possible an accelerated economic development of the
underdeveloped areas of the world . ^

Peaceful coopera

tion will thus reduce the gap between the rich and the
poor countries and eliminate one of the major sources of
strain and instability in economic and political inter
national relations.
Furthermore, coexistence is also viewed as a policy
which will hasten the change from capitalism to socialism.
There is no need for ideological wars now.
Socialism needs no Napoleonic wars. The
forces of socialism will grow quicker in
as much as peace is strong and international
tension is relaxed. For under these conditions
the eyes of the people . . . will turn to
the internal problems of their countries.
The aggressive imperlialist quarters . . .
are weak today . . . There is no reason to
doubt that their influence will continue
to weaken side by side with the strength
ening of political coexistence.
1^Josip Broz Tito, "Statement to the Federal
People's Assembly," Review of International Affairs,
Vol. VI (March 15, 1955) a P- 2.
^ E d v a r d Kardelj, "Evolution in Yugoslavia,"
Foreign Affairs Quaterly, Vol. XXXIV (January, 1956),
pp. 595-596.
i

R

Edvard Kardelj, Edvard Kardelj on Some Domestic
Questions and Current Major World Issues, Exerpts from
a Speech delivered in Maribor, October 25; 1959;
Yugoslav Facts and Views No. 109 (New York: Yugoslav
Information Center, 1959); P* 3*
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The Yugoslav communists do not view the concept of active
peaceful coexistence as a temporary phase in which one
social system waits for the moment when it becomes
strong enough to impose its will on other nations a d 
hering to a different ideology.

Therefore, peaceful

coexistence is to be based on the respect of such
principles as a nation's independence,

its sovereignty,

its equality and territorial integrity as well as on n o n 
interference into its internal a f f a i r s . F u r t h e r m o r e ,
the right of a people to live and work according to its
own precepts has to be recognized if peaceful coexis
tence is to succeed as a workable policy.
The principle of peaceful coexistence as perceived
by the Yugoslavs has changed from one which espouses
non-interference as interpreted during the era of Lenin
and Stalin to actual peaceful cooperation between
nations of different social systems.

Peaceful coexistence and power blocs

Peace can only be attained, according to the
Yugoslavs,

through peaceful coexistence based upon the

principles mentioned above.
commonly known as blocs,

The various power groupings,

do not respect these principles

•^"Declaration of the Heads of State or Government
of the Non-Aligned Countries," Review of International
Aff a i r s , Vol. XII (September
1961)* P* ^5*
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in their internal structure and organization.

All blocs,

so the Yugoslav communists contend, inescapably rest on
centralism and subjugation of the weaker to the stronger
and the smaller to the larger.

A bloc stands for a sys

tem of force signifying subordination to the mechanism.
determined and actuated by the power heading the bloc.

20

For one, therefore, blocs are rejected because they do
not grant to the member nation full equality and
independence.
For another, military blocs also represent a threat
to peace.

Blocs, although pronouncing the necessity for

peace, accelerate their preparations of war materials
and destructive weaponry and are therefore a latent but
ever present force toward world destruction.

Blocs

desire peace and prepare for war and thus prove the
ancient principle of si vis pacem para bellum to be the
underlying principle of bloc policies even in the days
of nuclear weaponry.
According to the Yugoslavs, agreements such as the
ban on nuclear weapons represent an important contribu
tion to world peace.

Unfortunately, such treaties

attempt to cure symptoms' rather than causes viz. the
various power groupings.

The way to achieve lasting

Kozarac, "The Fiction of the Third Bloc,"
Review of International Affairs, Vol. X (April, 1959 )>
p. 3-
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peace, so the Yugoslavs contend, will lead from the
destruction of the power blocs to active peaceful
coexistence between peoples.
Not only do military blocs threaten world peace,
but the economic groupings which have emerged in Western
Europe and in the communist orbit perpetuate in the same
direction.

The Yugoslavs are well in favor of economic

cooperation as long as the regional economic organiza
tions will be capable and willing to contribute to the
process of integration of the world economy and to the
mutual assistance of nations in the coordinated planned
development of their productive forces.

21

Due to the

enactment of discriminatory measures, which resulted in
increasingly closed markets, the economic regional organi
zations have not advanced in the direction.

Instead,

they have spread beyond their criterion of regionalism
and complimentary economy toward political power groupings on the basis of ideological similarity.

22

These

organizations have become a tool for economic struggle
against other countries.
Q

“I

Yugoslavia's Way, o p . cit., p. 80.
22Ljubomir Radobanovic, "The Meetings in Cairo and
Khartoum," Review of International Affairs, Vol. XII
(March 5j 19^2], p. 5~.
~
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Non-alignment
Based on the opinion that peace can only be attained
through active cooperation and that power groupings are
incongruent with this policy, the Yugoslavs champion
a policy of non-alignment.

The Yugoslav leaders have,

amongst others, attempted to loosely organize all those
nations which regard active peaceful cooperation a pre
condition for a lasting peace and which are not aligned
with any of the power blocs.

These countries wish to

act as a peace-promoting force in international politics.
They are, however, not organized nor formally aligned
to one another as to not represent a third bloc.

Miso

Pavicevic, the permanent representative of Yugoslavia
to the United Nations, states to this effect:
I am in full agreement . . . that there is
no 'neutral' bloc. The non-aligned
countries do not intend . . . to create
a bloc of their own for the simple reason
that they are against blocs in general
and that they believe that the creation
of a new bloc . . . could only increase
threats to the peace, which are already
disturbing enough and which are the
consequence of conflicts and actions
of the two existing b l o c s . ^3
President Tito agrees that the non-aligned nations repre
sent a third force in world politics if one understands
^Miso Pavicevic, On Disarmament, A Speech delivered
before the United Nation's First Committee, November 20,
1961, Yugoslav Facts and Views (New York: Yugoslav
Information Center, 1961), p. 6 .
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by a "third force" all those nations which,
of where they are located,

"irrespective

desire a lasting affirmation

of the policy of peaceful coexistence of states regard
less of all differences in their ideologies and social

1124
sy s tems.
The aim of the policy of the non-aligned nations,
according to the Yugoslav leadership,
development of the world community.

is the peace and
This policy is to

represent a creative force in world affairs.

It stresses

the progressive transformation of the world and inter
national relations on the basis of equality of all
nations and on democratic universal international
cooperation.
It should be noted that the Yugoslav insistence of
active peaceful coexistence and non-alignment is widely
of pragmatic nature.

Expelled from the Communist Bloc

In 1948 and unable to join the capitalist power groupings
due to ideological conceptions and political considera
tions,

the Yugoslav leadership had to attempt to walk

the small path between the two power blocs accepting
favors from both while being dependent on neither.

This

oil

Regarding Some Views on the Conference of N o n Aligned Countries, Yugoslav Pacts and Views, No. 131
(New York:
Yugoslav Information Center, 1961), p. 2.
^ " A n Incentive to Action - The Tito-Nasser Talks
in Belgrade," Review of International A f f a i r s , Vol. XV
(September 5 , 1964), p. 5*
~
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fact is also recognized in Yugoslavia.

In 1959 Mr.

Kozarac writes
The past decade has adequately shown that
this (policy) has been no sheer platonic
determination on Yugoslavia's part 5 hut
a most resolute struggle for national
survival^ in which the principles of con
sistent anti-bloc policy have definitely
triumphed.
The Role of the State
The Yugoslav conception of the role of the state
represents a reinterpretation of the Stalinist concept.
Stalin insisted that the state increase its power during
the socialist phase of development and only diminish in
authority after communism was attained.

In the Soviet

Union the increasing power of the state apparatus had
led to the emergence of such tendencies of bureaucratism
and centralism which became increasingly institutionalized
during the Stalinist period.

This development 5 contend

the Yugoslav ideologues., represents a deviation from
Marxist theory as expressed in Anti-Duehring in which
Fredrich Engels states:
The first act by virtue of which the state
really constitutes itself the representa
tive of the whole of society - the taking
possession of the means of production . . .
this is at the same time its last indepen
dent action as a state.
States' inter
ference in social relations becomes . . .
^KozaraCj op. c i t ., p. 3 -

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

superfluous and then withers away by itself.
The government of persons is replaced by
the administration of things and by the
management of the processes of production.
The state is not 'abolished.'
It withers
away.27
In connection with Engels' statement on the withering
away of the state, the Yugoslavs agree that the state
immediately following the revolution is an indispensable
force for the establishment of socialism.

The Program

of the League of Communists states this:
In the transition period, therefore, the
state should be an instrument of libera
tion of the socialist forces from capital
ism; an instrument of protection of their
free development in economic conditions of
socialization of the means of production;
and an instrument of democratically
organizing and politically and economically
strangthening these socialist forces.
Once the innitial period is passed the state must,
so argue the Yugoslavs, diminish its function even
though the class struggle has not completely ceased.
Milovan Djilas, who was later expelled from the Party
due to his ideological view which in the mid-fifties
came to differ substantially from that of the Party's
membership, appears to voice the party line in this
instance.

He states that

2^I. Lenin, State and Revolution (New York: Inter
national Publishers, 1932), pp. lti-19, citing Friedrich
Engels, Anti-Duehring (London and New York:
1933)•
pR

Yugoslavia's Way, o p . cit., p. 115 •
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. . . the "bourgeois is in every respect
a vestige of the former class, and in the big
cities even the petty bourgeoisie is gone.
Continuing the struggle against the
bourgeois reactionaries exclusively on
a theoretical basis . . .must now deviate
into bureaucratism . . .
The Yugoslav communists thus repudiated the Stalinist
doctrine that the class struggle becomes sharper the
closer a nation approaches socialism.
Under socialism "the form of the State has to be
modified to such an extent that the State becomes 'ab
sorbed by the State,' that it alienates and socializes
the functions gradually and definitely."-^0

The state

must disappear even while the productive forces are still
rather backward and the material conditions for full
socialism have not yet been reached.

In effect, the

Yugoslavs do not consider any state socialist unless
its power is diminishing.

However, while being in the

process of withering away, the state exists in its essen
tial elements and does play a certain indispensable role
in society.
During the era of socialist construction, two ten
dencies have to be avoided.

On one hand the tendency

to underestimate the role of the state by putting the
^^Djilas, Anatomy of a Moral . . ., op. cit., p. 113-

3°Jovan Djordjevic, "Socialism and Humanism,"
Review of International Affairs, Vol. VI (March 1, 1955) 3
p . 10.
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individual interest above that of the general population
has to he fought.

On the other hand the tendency to

deny the existence of the personal interest by substi
tuting for general property state property and for free
social relations administrative relations and for
socialist development government authority has to be
avoided also because this tendency will lead to the
11
emergence of etatism and bureaucratism.-1
In the Yugoslav conception the dictatorship of the
proletariat ceases to be an expression of force after
the socialization of the means of production has taken
place.

It becomes a phase of socialist development in

which the working class represents the leading force in
the social and political system.
By the dictatorship of the proletariat,
we do not mean an external form of state
or a method of organization of the poli
tical system during the period from capi
talism to socialism, and later to
communism, but social or rather classpolitical substance of such a government
and political system where the undisputed
leading role belongs to the working class .^
During the period of socialist construction, the state is
to wither away.

It is to appear less and less

as an

instrument of force and more and more as an instrument
of social self-management.

This disappearance

31jovan Djordjevic, "Individual and General Interests
in Socialism," Review of International Affairs, Vol. X
(September 16, 1959), P- 13•
32Yugoslavia1s Way, op. cit., p. 111.
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of the state, which is depicted as a slow and evolutionary
process, is to he achieved through the de-etatization of
the state.

"It b e g i n s s t a t e d Milovan Djilas in 1951,

where the real strength of the state is to
be found, in the national economy, in its
management, in the right which the state
has assumed to decide exclusively, how
„
to distribute the product of social labor. ^
In accordance with these conceptions, the Yugoslav state
has to a degree been divested from management and direct
control in the fields of economy, social affairs, edu
cation, and government.
The doctrine and the practice of decentralization of
administration and government authority have been justi
fied by the Marxist concept of the withering away of the
state.

The Yugoslavs hold that they did not only inter

pret Marx correctly but that they, through their practice
of decentralization, came closer in advancing socialism
than any other nation including the Soviet Union.
Ownership of the Means of Production
Socialist theory holds that the transformation of
society is impossible without a radical change in social
relations, especially In those relations pertaining to
production.

The socialization of the means of production

33]v[ilovan Djilas, "Yugoslav-Soviet Relations,"
International Affairs, Vol. XXVII (April, 1951), p. 172.
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the state has to assume ownership, management and control
over the socialized economy.
. . . keeping in mind that socialism cannot
be built in an industrially backward country
such as ours . . . without creating the
material conditions for it, we took the
means of production into our hands and b e 
gan creating the conditions for the victory
of socialism in our country.3A
Professor Radomir L u k i c ^ argues that it should theore
tically be possible to retain a system of state ownership,
control and management and yet achieve economic demo
cracy;
system,

economic democracy being defined as "an economic
i.e., a system of property over the means of

production in which the economic power is enjoyed by the
people, viz., by the majority and not by the minority."
Economic democracy under state control should be possible
because a state that is organized on a democratic basis
should also be able to exercise its economic power in a
fashion as to express the will of the people.
However,

so argue the Yugoslavs,

great economic

power vested in the state leads to an ever increasing
administrative apparatus and to the bureaucratization of
the state organs.

This tendency is said to have been

3^Josip Broz Tito, Workers Manage their Own Factories,
Speech delivered before the Yugoslav Federal Assembly,
June 26, 1950 (Belgrade:
Jugostampa, 1950), P- 17■^Radomir Lukic, "Economic Democracy," Review of
International Affairs, Vol. V (August 1, 195 ^ ) } P*
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amply manifested in the Soviet Union during the Stalin
era and thereafter.

Ultimately,

the bureaucrats will

develop the distinct features and interests of a new
class - the bureaucracy.
The control over the economy by the bureaucracy has
created a form of state capitalism where the bureaucracy
administers and distributes the surplus value in a way
as to enhance its own position and interests.

The p o s i 

tion of the producer has, in effect, become similar as
under capitalism where surplus value was appropriated
in accordance with the interests of the capitalist
minority.
Under such a system the socialization of the means
of production does not constitute the first step toward
making man an independent and creative worker and master
over his own fate in a democratic community of toilers
but left him a hired laborer, not of the individual
capitalist but of the administrative c l a s s . ^
so argue the Yugoslavs,

This,

is contrary to socialist theory

and Marxist doctrine.
In order to avoid the danger of state capitalism,
the control over the means of production cannot be left
exclusively to the state but must be vested, within cer
tain limits, in the workers themselves.

^ E d v a r d Kardelj, "Contemporary Yugoslavia,"
Review of International Affairs, Vol. VI (January 1,

1954), p. 14.
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By turning over the factories, mines, etc., to
the workers to manage, we will make it impos
sible for an infectious disease to take hold
there, a disease bearing the name of bureau
cracy.
This disease is easily and rapidly
carried over from bourgeois society, and it
is dangerous in the transition period . . .
Bureaucracy is among the biggest enemies
of socialism precisely because . . . people
are not conscious of it in the beginning.
It would be erroneous to think that bureau
cracy has not taken roots in our country,
too.37
The problem of a society based on self-management is the
avoidence of the reemergence of private ownership under
the guise of local collective ownership on one hand and
the danger of establishing a _de facto pattern of state
capitalism on the other.

To solve this problem a defi

nite amount of economic power is to be given to the
workers' councils which are to a great extent able to
plan their production and to appropriate surplus value.
The state, however, exercises its regulatory powers over
the workers' councils at various levels.

Under this

system of direct democracy, the economic plan ceases to
have binding authority and becomes a guiding measure and
an overall coordinating mechanism of the national economy
within a market situation.
In the economic system of Yugoslavia and
in accordance with the new relations in
production and distribution, all socialist
^Tito, Workers Manage Factories, op. cit., p. 36 .
Lukic, op. cit., p. 14.
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forces - from the individual and working col
lective to society as a whole - participate
directly in the distribution and dispose
independently of that part of the product
which belongs to them by law and social
plan, depending upon the results of the
work and operations of the economic
organization.39
According to Professor Jovan Dordevic,

40 the difference

between state capitalism and the system of socialist
property and producers’ self-management lies in the
relationship of the producer toward the means of produc
tion, the management of these means and the products of
social labor.
This system of social and economic self-management
is held to have two major advantages.

First, the state

has, by divesting itself from some control over the
economy and by diminishing the state apparatus, taken
a step further toward its disappearance.

Secondly, it

was argued that the system should reap practical economic
results.
The Yugoslav formula of the management of the pro
duction to the workers resembles syndicalist and guild
socialist principles rather than those of Marx and Lenin.
Whatever the origin of the formula, it was conceived of
by criticism of the state capitalist system of the
^ Y u g o s l a v i a ’s Way, op. cit., p. 157*
^ J o v a n Djordjevic, "Social Unity and the System of
Self-Management," Review of International Affairs, Vol.
VI (December 1, 1955)j P- H *
~—
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U.S.S.R. and was justified by Marxist theory.

"After

all," in the words of President Tito, "we are not using
any kind of stereotype but are rather being governed by
„4l
the science of Marxism and are going our own way . . .
The Role of the Party
In accordance with the general decentralization of
the functions of the state and with the establishment of
social self-management, the role of the Party had also
to be changed to a certain degree.

Milovan Djilas did

not appear to contradict the party-line when he stated
in 1953:
Under present conditions of social property,
every reinforcement of the role of political
movements . . . leads to delay and exploi
tation.
The times require instead a weaken
ing of his role . . . especially in our
country, under s o c i a l i s m .
In a society organized on the basis of social self
administration, an extension of the power of the Party
would not only be unnecessary, so argue the Yugoslav
leaders, but also represent a dangerous obstacle to the
growth of self-management.

The decline in the political

role of the League of Communists is forecast as a lengthy
process which will gain momentum as the forces of socialist
^Tito, Workers Manage Factories, op. cit., p. 11.
iip
Djilas, Anatomy of a Moral . . ., op. cat.,

p .88.
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democracy become stronger, develop and expand.

This

regress of political power of the League will proceed
parallel to the decreasing social antagonisms and
conflicts.^3
Under these circumstances the tasks of the commu
nists and their organization have changed considerably.
While once their work was required to center on the state
administration on organizing and operating the state
organs, now with the strengthening of socialist relations
these tendencies would lead to the bureaucratization of
both the state and the party.

It became, therefore,

necessary to separate the tasks of the Party from that
of the state and its administration.
The League of Communists should not per
form tasks which should be performed by
other bodies, neglect their principle
task which is to be abreast of general
trends, to give impetus to the practice
of self-administration rights of the
working people and to do their utmost
to that end.by political and ideologi
cal means.
Where the Party was
the

once the eyes and ears of the regime,

sole arbitrator of what constituted right or wrong,
llQ

-Tor examples see Yugoslavia's Way, op. cit.,
pp. 122, 165, 167, 235.
^Alexander Rankovic, "Current Problems in Rela
tion to the Work and Role of the League of Communists
of Yugoslavia," A Speech delivered to the VIII Congress
of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Practice and
Theory of Socialist Development in Yugoslavia (Belgrade:
Medunarodna Politica, 1965)* P- 122.
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the judge of trends., schools and styles in science and
art; the League today is to be less and less a factor
of authority and to become more and more a factor of
forming and developing the socialist consciousness of the
working masses.

The League has become the educator of

the people.
The Yugoslavs reject the idea that the elite party
represents the whole proletariat but emphasize that the
whole nation must judge what constitutes happiness for
i t , T h e

Party is to speak through the working class

rather than for it.

Rather than playing the leading

role in society it is to play one of the leading roles
maintaining, however, indirect influence over the other
institutions.
Nonetheless, the Yugoslav leadership regards the
League of Communists as the vanguard of the working
people.

The Party embodies those working people who are

embued with social consciousness.

It is the task of

these chosen individuals and of the Party as an organi
zation to transfer this consciousness through education
upon the working masses.

The communists as individuals

and as an organization are, through-their training and
experience, able to perceive and register various
phenomena.

They are to evaluate, relying as far as

^ t . p. Svennevig, "Ideology of the Yugoslav
Heretics," Social Research, Vol. XXVII (Spring, i 960),
p. 42.
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possible upon their practical work and the scientific
analyses provided by various institutions.

Accordingly,

the communists will formulate decisions and guide the
working people toward the desired goals.

46

According to the principles of decentralization,

the

communists should act more and more as individuals in
fluencing the administration in various fields of
Yugoslav life rather than an organization.

The indi

vidual member of the communist organizations is to
become,

within the framework of social self-administration,

a person who takes an independent attitude toward con
crete problems within the,field of his activity.

At

the same time he bears full responsibility for his
attitude and its implementation.

Hence, the Yugoslavs

have attempted to reduce the direct influence of the
League of Communists in various fields such as govern
mental,

social, educational and others and have sub

stituted for it the influence and persuasion of the
individual communist.

In addition the League of

Communists has reduced its professional staff and dele
gated a greater amount of power and responsibility to
the republican and grass-root levels of the organization.
Notwithstanding these changes the doctrine of
democratic centralism remains as the base of the

^Rankovic,

op. c i t ., p. 119-
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League's internal life and work.

Veljko Vlahovic states

that the
. . . abandonment of the principle of demo
cratic centralism in the League of Communists
would mean breaking it up into various
factions guided by diverse interests and
conceptions springing mainly from contra
dictions in socialist development. In
effect, this would amount to the liquida
tion of the League of Communists and
consequently to the surrender of socialist
social development to blind forces. '
However, this unity of action and ideology is not to be
achieved by pronouncements from the highest ranks of the
League but rather through democratic battles of ideas
and constructive criticism which should not only point
out the negative features but also guide toward and
stimulate what is progressive and positive in any given
state of affairs.

In addition the leadership of the

League is responsible to its membership for its deci
sions and its work as it is responsible to the whole
people.

Furthermore, the introduction of the rotation

system and the principle of limited re-election point
toward the increasing democratization of the Party.
Notwithstanding these changes hopes that the Party
might decrease its power immediately and to a considerably
^Veljko Vlahovic, "Present Ideological Trends in
our Development and the Tasks in Front of the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia," A Speech delivered to the
VIII Congres of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia,
Practice and Theory of Socialist Development in
Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Medunarodna Politica, 1965),
p. 177-
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greater extent have not been fulfilled.

In addition

any aspiration that other parties might be allowed to
express their political opinions has come to naught.
The League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance of
the Working People of Yugoslavia^ in which the communists
play a decisive and guiding role, remain the only two
organizations through which the political opinions and
aspirations of the people can be expressed.
Agricultural Aspects in Yugoslavia
Pragmatic considerations can be regarded as the key
factor for the change in Yugoslav ideology regarding
agriculture.

Prior to 1954 collectivization in agri

culture was regarded as prerequisite for the achievements
of socialism in the country.

This was exemplified by

the collectivization drive the Yugoslav government under
took from 1945 to 1950.

During this period the peasants

were forced by various measures such as financial policy
and artificially low food prices to join Peasant Work
Cooperatives^ a collective farm organization closely
resembling the Soviet kolchoz pattern.
By 1950 it became apparent that the forced collecti
vization of agriculture had been an economic failure.
Approximately one-third of the collective farms reaped
profits., another third broke even and the rest were
unprofitable.

Groping for new formulas everywhere
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and recognizing the necessity for the support of that
part of the population engaged in agriculture, the
Yugoslav leadership decided to abandon the collectivi
zation of agriculture at all cost and to set out on a
new road.
Instead of forcing the private peasants in collective
farms, the Yugoslav government advocated cooperatives of
a general type where the farmers maintain ownership over
their land as well as over the means of production.
. . . the organization of this cooperative
farm and the mode of operation coordinates
the deep seated ownership mentality of the
Yugoslav peasant with the gradual introduction of socialist elements in agriculture.
Discrimination against the private peasant has subsided,
and his status has been recognized.

Furthermore, the

government advocates institutionalized cooperation
between the private peasants and the general cooperatives.
Private ownership in agriculture and the concept
of socialism are not regarded as contradictory during the
present stage of Yugoslav development.

The land holdings

have been limited to a maximum of ten to fifteen hectares
depending on whether the land is tilled by an individual
farmer or by a peasant family.

In reality the private

plots average four to five hectares only.

This size

^ P e t k o Rasic, Agricultural Development in Yugoslavia
(Belgrade: Publishing Enterprise Jugoslavija, 1955)j
p. 35.
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plot can be cultivated by the individual peasant family
without making the employment of additional labor power
necessary.

Hence, according to the Yugoslavs, exploita

tion of man by man has been abolished in the agricultural
sphere.

This is regarded as an important step toward

the establishment of socialist relations in agriculture.
Considering that land holdings in Yugoslavia
are almost exclusively small or medium sized,
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia believes
that the process of socialization of land will
not consist in a forced general nationalization
of similar means but primarily in socialization
of agricultural production based on increasingly
stronger forces of production in the economy
and especially in agriculture; in gradual
socialist transformation of the village; in
uniting the peasants through cooperatives
or in cooperation of the peasants with the
social sector of agricultural production. ^
This policy, however, should not be regarded as the ulti
mate solution.
The general type of peasant cooperative . . .
presented a kind of practical school in
which the cooperative consciousness of the
peasant was fostered.
Their function would
cease once this consciousness reached a cer
tain level and be integrated into a more
advanced cooperative organization . . .
The Yugoslav concept regarding the achievement of social
ism in the villages has been termed socialism by
o s m o s i s . According to this concept the Yugoslavs
hq

^Yugoslavia1s Way, o p . cit., p. 130.

gO
^ Rasic, ojo. cit., p. 35 -^George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia
and the New Communism (New York: Twentieth Century
Fund, 1962), p. 171-
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proceed with socialism in the economy while allowing
the peasants to maintain the ownership of their land.
As socialism develops, so the Yugoslav ideologues hope,
the whole country will he permeated by the socialist
spirit, and the peasants will ultimately lose their indi
vidualistic outlook and accept cooperatives of some sort.
It should be noted that the Yugoslav government is
not satisfied with the existing situation in agriculture.
The small privately owned plots do not lend themselves
to the use of technological innovation.

The use of

modern machinery on land holdings of such size is
economically inefficient.

Furthermore, the small plots

do not produce enough foodstuffs over and above the need
of the individual peasant so as to sustain the needed
food supplies for the population as a whole.

In addition

too many people who could be used in other fields of the
economy are tied down in agricultural production.

The

cooperatives and the cooperation between the private
peasants and the social sector of agriculture have not,
up to now, been able to solve the existing problem.
Ideologically committed to keep the capitalist element
from reoccuring in the agricultural sphere and being
confronted with the failure of collectivization, the
Yugoslavs are groping for novel paths to solve their
agricultural predicament.
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The Nationality Question and Federalism
Yugoslavia is a country composed of various nationali
ties and national minorities who differ from one another
in language, cultural and historical background, reli
gious beliefs and economic development.

The nationality

question has constituted a major problem ever since the
formation of Yugoslavia as a nation.
"Old Yugoslavia" was organized as a unitary state
dominated by the Serb nationality.

The peoples from the

former Austro-Hungarian Empire as well as the non-Slav
minorities had little if any say in the government of
the c o u n t r y . Serbian hegemony, the denial of
autonomy to the other peoples as well as the suppression
of all opposition to the regime, left the South Slavs
with hatred and disgust for a centralized unitary state.
These factors in addition to the atrocities that were
committed between the nationalities during the war made
a return to a unitary form of government impossible if
Yugoslavia was ever to emerge as a viable nation.
In order to solve the nationality problem, "new
Yugoslavia" was proclaimed a federal state comprised of
six socialist republics, each of which covers the terri
tory inhabited by one or more of the Yugoslav nationali
ties and is founded on the principle of nationality.
^ M u r i e l Heppek and Frank B. Singleton, Yugoslavia
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961 ), p. 156 •
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Unity of Yugoslavia is possible only on
the basis of national development and full
equality of the Serbs, Groats, Slovenes,
Macedonians and Montenegrins, as well as
the national minorities. For this reason
socialist Yugoslavia was born a federal
state of equal peoples.
It could not have
been created otherwise.5o
In order to ensure the free development of the minoritie
two autonomous regions were organized in the Socialist
Republic of Serbia.

Unity of the Yugoslav peoples,

according to President Tito, does not mean the elimi
nation of the nationalities, their heritage and custom
and the establishment of a single Yugoslav nation but
rather a "new type of social community in which the
common interests of all nationalities find expression.-'
All nationalities and national minorities are
accorded all citizens' rights; they are guaranteed equal
political as well as cultural rights.

The minorities

enjoy the right to cultural development and the free
use of their language.

In some ways, however, the

Yugoslav policy exceeds these "classic" rights of minori
ties.

Real equality amongst people, so contend the

Yugoslavs in accordance with M arx’s teachings, must also
include economic equality.

In order to achieve this

equality, economic aid is offered by the more developed
^Yugoslavia's Way, o p . cit., p. 189■^Tito, Practice and Theory of Socialist Develop
ment in Yugoslavia, op. cit.', p.
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parts of the country - through the Federation - to the
less-developed ones.

This effects, to a large extent,

the minorities who occupy the least-developed areas of
the country.
Each of the Socialist Republics enjoys cultural
autonomy and the right to determine its internal affairs
unless otherwise provided for by the Constitution.

The

Constitution of 19^3 states:
The working people of the republic shall exercise
social self-government, regulate social rela
tions, determine the course of economic devel
opment and of the development of the social ser
vices . . . and discharge all social affairs
of common concern for the political, economic
and cultural life and social development in
the republic, with the exception of the
affairs determined by the Constitution, to
be the rights and duties of the Federation.
Especially after the decentralization of the func
tions of the state, federalism has emerged in Yugoslavia
as a system where duties and rights are divided between
the central government and the governments of the
republics.

The federal system has to a great extent

solved the nationality problem by guaranteeing to the
republics and autonomous regions, which are founded on
the basis of nationality, the right to cultural selfdetermination.

Due to the establishment of the federal

^^The Constitution of the Socialist Federal
People's Republic . . ., op. cit., Art. 108.
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system no nationality has been able to dominate the
nation, and the hatred between the Yugoslav people has
decreased considerably.
Yugoslavia’s nationality problem was faced by the
Soviet Union on a larger scale.

Both multi-national

states sought to solve it by similar constitutional
means; in both cases federalism was used as a solution.
However, the Yugoslavs critize the Soviet conception of
federalism and the harsh treatment of the nationalities
during the Stalin era.

The nationalities in the Soviet

Union had, contend the Yugoslavs, little if any of the
cultural autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.
Instead, Stalin's policy of russification attempted to
force the nationalities to conform to the Great Russian
tradition and to learn the Russian language.

Even worse

various nationalities were destroyed by uprooting them
from their territories.^

This cruel treatment of the

nationalities and the policy of Great Russian chauvinism,
so argue the Yugoslavs, were not in the spirit of Marx's
and Lenin's teachings but were similar to the Serbian
hegemony during the bourgeois period of Yugoslavia's
development.
-^Radovan Lalic, The Russian Language and Great
Russian Chauvinism (New York: Yugoslav Information
Center, 1950)j P* 2.
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Although the establishment of federalism in
Yugoslavia has solved various problems, it has not been,
especially after the decentralization of the state's
functions, an unmixed blessing.
cularism has raised its head.

Here and there parti
Regions and republics

are concerned with their own well being rather than with
that of the entire nation.

The industrialized areas

do not feel much responsibility for the industriali
zation of the lesser-developed regions, and they resent
the fact that some of their capital is used to further
the development of these areas.

Finally, dislike and

hatred between the various groups still linger on.
Yugoslavia today does not present a picture of
national unity but rather a country with various centers
of gravity each more concerned with its own powers and
rights while disregarding to a certain extent the needs
and rights of other areas.

In this respect Yugoslavia

appears today as the Communist Camp _en miniature where
poli-centrism proves to be an obstacle to further
unity.

These tendencies amongst the Yugoslav peoples,

so hope the communists, will decline with the further
development of socialist consciousness.
Socialist Democracy
To the Yugoslavs the decentralization of the func
tions of the state also involves democracy.

The
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withering away of the state must be concerned to some
degree with freedom and human rights.

Djilas did not

seem to be in opposition to the Party's official view
when he wrote:
A free socialist economy calls for an appro
priate form; socialist democracy . . . The
task (of deciding how and where means
should be spent) belongs to the repre
sentatives of those who have created the
means. Discussion and controversy is
inevitable.
Other conflicts arise as
well . . . This is what is called
socialist democracy; free and open dis
cussion within the framework of socialist
forces.57
Although freedom and human rights are necessary for
realization of socialist democracy, this type of
democracy differs from bourgeois democracy.

While it

takes from the latter those achievements that are posi
tive and lasting in the field of individual rights and
those organizational political forms which remain valid
under socialism, it adapts itself to the rights, inter
ests and needs of the free activities of the forces and
factors of the social and economic movement of socialism^
Socialist democracy, contend the Yugoslavs, is direct or
mass democracy where workers manage their own factories,
where working people manage the basic units of society the communes - and where interested citizens and
5^Djilas, Anatomy of a Moral . . ., _op. cit., p. 49*
•^Yugoslavia's Way, op. cit., pp. l6l-l62.
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organizations take part in the management of social
organizations.

Bourgeois democracy,

on the other hand,

is said to he hoth in theory and in practice indirect
democracy where power is wielded by the elite via the
party leadership.

Socialist democracy will develop into

a "democracy of all and for all, a complete system of
free,

social g o v er n m e n t .

Professor Dordevic defines

socialist democracy as:
. . . a political system in which, first, the
working people play the decisive role in the
determination of policy; second, this decisive
role of the working people is assured by a
system of political, socio-economic and indi
vidual rights such as not only to allow but
also organize self-government by the people
and the rights of individuals at all levels;
third, political and other decisions adopted
correspond to the interests and aspirations
of the socialist community.
In addition,
there should be added a fourth condition;
those who work . . . not only determine
policy but to the greatest possible extent
themselves obligarily put it into execution.
In connection with the conception that individual
rights are necessary in a socialist democracy, the
Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Y u g o 
slavia guarantees amongst others freedom of the press
and freedom of speech and of public expression.

These

freedoms are guaranteed only as long as they are not
^Ibid.,

p. 162.

^ J o v a n Djordjevic, "Some Principles of Socialist
Democracy in Yugoslavia," N ew Yugoslav L a w , No. 3-^
(July-Deeember, 1952), p. 19-
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used "by anyone to overthrow the foundations of the
socialist democratic order . . ."^1

Freedom of speech

and public expression are only possible to a limited
degree.

The Djilas affair is a clear example of how

far this freedom may be carried and what represents an
overthrow of the socialist foundations of the country.
Milovan Djilas' advocacy of a multi-party system
represented an attack on the socialist foundations of
Yugoslavia.

The institution of a multi-party system, so

insisted Edvard Kardelj,

P

would inevitably destroy the

socialist foundation of Yugoslavia as well as the
nation's independence.

In the event that Yugoslavia

adopted a multi-party system., it is questionable that
truly national parties would emerge.

Probably most

parties would be ethnic (Serb, Croat, or Slovene) as
they were before World War II.

In this case the

smoldering hatred between the ethnic groups might make
a workable government impossible.

Furthermore, the

bourgeois element might again emerge and destroy the
foundations of the socialist state.

Given the premis

that parties reflect different economic interests,
Yugoslavia does not need more than one party, so the
^ T h e Constitution of the Socialist Federal People's
Republic, ojo. cit., Art. 40.

6 %eal, o£. cit., p. 25, citing Edvard Kardelj,
Socijalisticka Demokratija.(Belgrade:
1952), pp. 28-29-
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communists believe, because there is no fundamental
difference in the economic interests.
The freedom of expression is limited
. . . in a way that criticism against
Stalinism is permitted., not, however,
against Communism as such. Whoever cros
ses the boundary of communism in the
direction of democracy has to discover
the limits of freedom of s p e e c h . 3
In conclusion criticism against the governments
and the League of Communists may be voiced by individuals
only.

This criticism may not advocate anti-socialist

principles.

Within these limits, however, the Yugoslavs

as individuals are free to air their grievances, to
criticize the government and to suggest improvements.

6^4

^Gunther Bartsch, "Djilas and Kowalkowski,"
Osteuropa, Jahrgang 13, Wo. 5^"Riding Both Horses in Mid-Stream," Economist,
Vol. CCXV (May 22, 1965), p. 898 .
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CHAPTER I V

THE IMPACT OP THE YUGOSLAV PATH
ON THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS

Yugoslavia's experience has had an impact upon the
communist movement as a whole, upon the relations "between
the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw
Pact,

as well as on the reforms that were instituted by-

most of the Soviet Bloc countries including the
U.S.S.R.

itself.

The Yugoslav path has been of historic significance
as a movement of revolt against Stalinism and Moscow
domination.

Yugoslav criticism and Yugoslav ideology

have pointed out the essentially Russian interpretation
of Marxism as applied by Lenin and Stalin.

They have

also broken the connection between Russian nationalism
and communism.

Those dogmas of p r e - 19^8, namely that

communism implies giving support to the Soviet Union .and
that the Soviet pattern must remain the example for the
rest of the communist world,
acceptance of these dogmas,

lie shattered.

Without the

Soviet hegemony over other

communist nations becomes untenable.

Under such circum

stances it becomes questionable whether a new communist
nation somewhere in the world would mean an increase in
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the power of the Soviet Union.

The monolith has teen

destroyed, and Yugoslavia administered the first blow.
Canossa in Reverse and the East European Scene
Elements of "Titoism," viz. nationalist opposition
within the communist ranks against the Stalinist policies
existed within most of the states of East Europe.

This

nationalist opposition grew out of the dual tasks the
communists had to perform:

on the one hand they were

to serve the Soviet Union, and on the other hand they
were to stay in power and build communism to the best
of their abilities .1
coincide.

The two interests did not always

Whenever Moscow insisted on economic policies

that were benefiting the Soviet Union but of disadvantage
to the East European nation concerned, whenever Stalin
forced the East European nations to conform to Soviet
practices which did not fit the different conditions,
the communist leaders of the nations of the Eastern Bloc
were somewhat compromised.

These nations had little

choice but to swallow the bitter pill while Belgrade was
pursuing its independent road.
In the initial period following Yugoslavia's expul<•

sion, the country's impact on East Europe was almost
entirely negative.

Yugoslavia was, after all, collabo

rating with the "imperialist forces" and made concessions
^Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 58-59•
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to its farmers.

In addition the early economic troubles

the Balkan nation faced,, partly due to the withdrawal
of Soviet and East European aid and the cancellation of
the trade agreements, were extolled by the Soviet and
East European press.

The communist press attempted to

show that a communist country outside the Bloc could not
survive without becoming a traitor to communism.
After Stalin's demise the need to effect a reconcil
iation with Yugoslavia was not only the result of a
decision to terminate the liability of an internationally
unpopular external policy but also a necessary precon
dition for any scheme of domestic reform.

Krushchev

put forth a huge program of domestic reforms to improve
the economic situation of the Soviet peoples.

In order

to carry out these reforms, he had to remove the stigma
of "Titoism" from such activities.

In the international

realm the Soviet Union had difficulty advocating a
policy of peaceful coexistence while pretending that
Yugoslavia, a socialist nation, was the embodiment of all
evil.

Furthermore, Yugoslavia enjoyed good relations

with most of the developing nations of Africa and Asia.
If the Soviet leaders wished to improve the relations
with these nations, it was advisable that they also
improve their relations with Yugoslavia.
Bulganin's and Krushchev's visit to Belgrade was
the outcome of such considerations.

The humiliating
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visit signaled a shift in the Soviet policy line.

To

some of the East European nations, "Canossa in reverse"
represented the acceptance of the Yugoslav position that
each country has a right to determine its own path to
socialism.

This,, in turn, meant the negation of Stalin’s

doctrine that communism was to he primarily in the inter
est of the Soviet Union.

The rehabilitation of Tito

and of the victims of the Titoist purges in the satellite
countries could not but discredit the most loyal exponent
of Soviet supremacy within these nations.

Furthermore,

the revelations of the 20th Party Congress fostered the
opinion that the Soviet Union, after having displayed
clear signs of degeneration, could no longer be regarded
2
as the sole model of communist practice and theory.
Subsequently, a revolt against Soviet tutelage
broke loose ranging from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
The communist governments of East Europe made known their
desire to serve the national interest rather than that
of the Soviet Union and to loosen the rigid totalitarian
pattern.
How far the Soviet leadership intended the thaw in
the relationship between itself and the other Warsaw Pact
nations to last is hard to ascertain.

It seems clear,

^Richard Lowenthal, "Revolution over Eastern Europe,
Twentieth Century, Vol. CLX (December, 1956), p. 484.
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however, that Moscow did not intend that the national
independence which has been recognized as inevitable
for the regimes of Mao and Tito should apply fully to
the other East European nations.

All the Soviet leader

ship meant to grant was the replacement of detailed
control through mixed companies., Soviet police agents
and "advisers," by military, economic and party ties
at the to p .
With Krushchev's visit to Belgrade, the relations
between the East European nations and the U.S.S.R. had,
if only symbolically, entered into a new phase.

This

new era was characterized by the abolition of the
Cominform.

The revolutions in Hungary and Poland were

the dramatic manifestations of the period.

The violent,

to a degree anti-communist but certainly anti-Soviet,
outbreaks resulted in the Soviet attempt to restore a
degree of block solidarity.

Nevertheless, the nations

of East Europe have obtained by far a greater amount of
freedom than formerly; Soviet hegemony over East Europe
has not been the same
The developments

ever since.
of the EastEuropean countries

during the period of the thaw revealed some impact of
Yugoslav practice and ideology.

Some decentralization

was carried out in almost all the countries, and all
attempted to shake to

some degree

country, however, has

been

the Soviet yoke.

able to introduce

No
the Yugoslav

system as a whole.
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The Struggle Against Soviet Domination
Mr. Krushchev's visit to Yugoslavia, the rehabili
tation of those East European leaders sentenced for
their nationalistic tendencies during the Stalin era
and the revelations of the 20th Party Congress of the
C.P.S.U. made the nations of East Europe hope for greater
independence from the Soviet Union.

The struggles of

Poland and Hungary against governments dedicated to a
Stalinist policy represent the landmarks of this period.
The Stalinists were overthrown by the faction of the
Party which had gained popular support.

In both cases

the new leadership was committed to national indepen
dence and to economic and political reforms.
Poland
In Poland Wladislaw Gomulka, a member of the
Communist Party, formerly condemned for his nationalistic
tendencies, took over the reins of the government.
Mr. Gomulka had the personality of a leader.
also a long-time communist.

He was

He was able to control the

Polish people and to translate their wishes into conces
sions obtained from the Soviet Union.

Mr. Gomulka never

wanted to leave the Socialist Camp; yet, immediately
following the ’’Polish October," he attempted to become
an independent member of the Communist Bloc having relations
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with hoth East and West.

Poland attempted to follow a

foreign policy line similar to that of Yugoslavia without
endangering its relationship in the socialist family.-'
Soviet reassertion of its claim on hloc leadership
following the Hungarian revolution made the Polish
government abandon its desire for an independent foreign
policy.

Domestic freedom was purchased with diplo-

matic and ideological conformity.
The rigid totalitarian pattern was loosened.

For

two years following the "Polish October," freedom of
expression and public criticism of the regime was
possible.

At a time when Milovan Djilas was sentenced

and resentenced to prison terms, party discipline in the
Polish Workers' Party was lax.

The Polish election was

freer than those in Yugoslavia in a sense that, despite
the single ticket, several parties ran candidates.

In

addition the number of candidates far exceeded the number
of seats available.
In retrospect these concessions appear to have been
adaptations to necessity rather than reflections of
changes in principle.

When Mr. Gomulka had defeated

the Stalinist wing of the Party, he turned against the
^Hoffman and Weal, op. cit., p. 457.
^■"Gomulka and Tito," New Statesman, Vol. LVI
(July, 1958), p. 3-
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"revisionists," i.e., those members of the Party who
wanted greater liberalization .^1 By 1958 the criticism
against the Polish government and the Soviet Union was
brought under control.^
Poland has undergone some of the hoped-for poli
tical and economic changes, and it has also maintained
a special place amongst the countries of East Europe in
relation to the Soviet Union.

However, ideological

changes have not been permitted in Poland.

Ideological

departures from the Soviet interpretation of Marxist
and Leninist doctrine are almost completely absent.
The various reforms that were instituted in Poland
following the "Polish October" never received an ideo
logical justification as had the reforms in Yugoslavia.
It is, therefore, not surprising that several of the
reforms that were legalized by the Gomulka government
after the revolt were curtailed after an initial period
had elapsed and the situation had changed as to allow
such curtailment.
Hungary
Yugoslav influence became visible in the Hungarian
policies of the New Course put forth by the government
^"Current Developments:
Vol. VI (June, 1957), P- 30.

Poland," East Europe,

^"Current Developments:
Poland," East Europe,
Vol. VI (December, 1957), P- 3^-
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of Imre Nagy, 1953 to 1955-

The policies and policy

aims of this government closely resembled those of the
Yugoslav government.

Mr. Nagy ,''7 amongst others., criti

cized the terrible state of the Hungarian economy which
in his opinion had resulted from the adoption of Soviet
policies without making allowances for the needs of
Hungary.

He also insisted that a people cannot be free

as long as the nation is not independent and as long
as it lacks complete sovereignty.

In addition Imre

Nagy professed the belief that the proper evolution of
a socialist society is based on the principle of
coexistence amongst nations traveling different roads
under particular national conditions free, independent
and equal.
The relaxations of the totalitarian features of
the regime and the wish to curb the power of the bureau
cracy were some of the objectives of the New Course.
In order to realize these objectives., Mr. Nagy argued,
as did the Yugoslavs, for the participation of the
working masses in the exercise of power and administraO
tion and for their control over the government.
^These views are expressed in Imre Nagy, Imre
Nagy on Communism:
In Defense of the New Course
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957}, pp. 28-31■

8Ibid., p. 215 and p. 221 .
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Mr. Nagy did not gain complete control over the
Party and never received the full hacking of the Soviet
leadership which would have been necessary to carry out
changes of such dimensions.

In 1955 the government of

Imre Nagy fell into disrepute with the Hungarian
Stalinists and the Soviet leadership due to its national
istic tendencies.

Its successor government was led by

the Stalinist faction of the Party which doggedly
followed Soviet policies.
To the extent that the Yugoslav experience contri
buted to the Hungarian revolution, it had its greatest
impact in 19^6.

In the first part of the revolution,

Yugoslav influence was clearly manifested.

The national

ist wing of the Party wished to stress the independence
of Hungary and to institute reforms under the guidance
of a liberalized Communist Party.

This policy was at

that time supported by the population which accepted the
return to Leninism as the creed of the new system.^
The Soviet Union, faced for the second time with an
upheaval in the Bloc, might have accepted such a policy
as long as Hungary would have remained under communist
rule and maintained its membership in the Warsaw Pact.
The government of Imre Nagy, carried by the mood of the
population, however, overstepped the boundaries within
^"Documents from Budapest," Journal of Central
European Affairs, Vol. XVII (July, 1957), p. TjW.
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w h ic h th e S o v ie t U nion was w i l l i n g

t o make c o n c e s s io n s

by announcing the abolition of the one-party system,
by reconstituting the democratic parties and by pledging
free elections.

In addition Mr. Nagy no longer opted

for a Hungary within the Socialist Camp but for an
independent nation outside the Warsaw Pact.
The Hungarian people and the Hungarian
National Committee denounces the Warsaw
Pact as being contrary to the Hungarian
peace treaty and the Covenant of the UNO.
At the same time it places Hungary under
the defense of the Security Council of
the UNO from any kind of aggression.
On the pattern of Austria, Hungary
declares her neutrality.
She wants good
relations with all the peoples of the
world on the basis of equality.
By advocating a Western type parliamentary democracy,
Hungary went further than even Yugoslavia and brought
upon itself the second Soviet intervention.
Rumania
It was in the early i960 's when the Rumanian
communist leadership revolved against Soviet dominations.
The new road that was taken by the Rumanian communists
was partly facilitated by the Sino-Soviet dispute.1'1'
The Soviet leadership was so engulfed in its polemics
with the Chinese communists that it failed to take a

1QIbid., p. 178 .
11Michael Gamarnikov, "Comecon Today,” East Europe,
Vol. XIII (June, 1964), p. 7 .
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strong stand against Rumania when the latter refused to
accept its economic assignment within the East European
common market, viz. the Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance (COMECON).

Rumania's insistence to continue

to huild its heavy industry, notwithstanding the fact
that the international division of labor within East
Europe did not at that stage warrant the nation's posi
tion, challenged the principle that community interest
should prevail over the interests of each national unit.
Although the Rumanian leadership insists upon the
priority of its national interest, Gherghii-Dej, the
First Secretary of the Rumanian Workers Party, declared
that he would accept the principles of the socialist
international division of labor if it be based upon
"the spirit of the principles proclaimed by the i960
Moscow statement of observance of national independence
and sovereignty, of full equality of rights, comradely
III

mutual aid and mutual benefit.

P

In accordance with these

principles, Rumania insisted upon its independence in
foreign trade relations regardless of the criticism that
was brought to bear upon the country by the Soviet Union
and the other COMECON nations.
Regarding the relationships between socialist nations
and communist parties, the Rumanian leadership professes
■^J. B. Thompson, "Rumania's Struggle with Comecon,"
East Europe, Vol. XIII (June, 1964), p. 7-
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ideas resembling those of the Yugoslavs.
. . . the socialist countries can achieve
their unity of action in all domains . . .
"by reciprocal consultation and joint elab
oration of certain common stands as regards
the major problems of principles and not by ^
establishing . . . some superstate solution.1-^
In addition the Rumanian communists contend that no
party has or can have a privileged place so as to allow
the imposition of its opinions on other parties but
that "each party makes its own contribution to the
development of the common treasure of Marxist-Leninist
teachings . .

These opinions indeed come close

to the Yugoslav interpretation of the concept of
communist internationalism.
In regard to the problem of peaceful or non
peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism, the
Rumanians support the position that this factor can
only be determined by the concrete historical condi
tions of each country and that although not very likely
peaceful transition is indeed possible.

Furthermore,

the Rumanian communists are advocats of peaceful
coexistence, the banning and liquidation of nuclear
armaments and agree with the Yugoslavs that all military
-*-3"A Rumanian Manifesto," Exerpts from the State
ment of the Rumanian Workers Party concerning the
Problems of the World Communist and Workers Movement,
East Europe, Vol. XIV (January, 1965 )3 P* 30.

1^Ibid.
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blocs represent a threat to world peace and ought to
be abolished.^
Rumania has been determined to retain the achieved
independence from Moscow and has troubled the Soviet
leadership with its attitude concerning the Sino-Soviet
dispute in which the East European nation took upon
itself the position of a mediator.
Rumania has tacitly accepted important parts of the
Yugoslav ideological framework and continues to’ build
its national independence Yugoslav style.

In the domestic

sphere, however, Rumania has seen little of the reforms
that swept over East Europe and that had certain features
in common with those previously instituted in Yugoslavia.
The ideological similarities between the Yugoslav frame
work and that of the Rumanian's extend to the inter
national political and economic spheres.
Yugoslav Impact upon East European
and Soviet Reforms
Almost all of the East European nations, as well
as the Soviet Union, have experienced some reforms and
decentralization of the economy in the post-Stalin period.
In the case of Poland and Hungary, several reforms which
have certain features in common with those undertaken
15"current Developments:
Rumania," East Europe,
Vol. XIV (January, 1965), p. 50*
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in Yugoslavia grew out of the respective revolutions.
The Gomulka government retained most of these reforms
which were legalized by the government ex post facto,
although they were ridded of some of their significance
in the decade following the "Polish October."

In the

case of Hungary, many of the reforms which were estab
lished during the revolutionary period were abolished
by the post-revolutionary government of Janos Kadar.
Czechoslovakia also experienced significant economic
reforms which were caused, like those in the Soviet
Union, by the inefficiency in management due to over
centralization.

In both cases the reforms were not

modeled after the Yugoslav pattern although similarities
can be found.

All Warsaw Pact members that instituted

significant reforms profited from Yugoslav experience
and criticism, and if only in this fashion, Yugoslavia's
way has had significant impact upon those countries.

It

should be noted, however, that in the case of all these
nations no attempt has been made to justify the estab
lished reforms ideologically.

Due to the fact that

the reforms never completely destroyed the old system,
this perhaps was not necessary.
Poland
Several of the reforms instituted in Poland after
the crisis of 1956 show similarities with those undertaken
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in Yugoslavia.

One of these was the establishment of

workers' councils in the Polish enterprises.
During the widespread labor unrest in Poland,
working crews in several factories elected workers'
councils.

These incidences make it clear that even

under the pre-Gomulka government which was committed
to Stalinist policies Yugoslav influence and Polish sup
port for a similar system were present.

This influence,

as well as the support, remained "underground" until
the circumstances allowed an open acknowledgment.
The law on the workers' councils of 1956 represented
a recognition of already existing conditions.

The

organization of the workers' councils in Poland is
similar to their Yugoslav counterparty their powers,
however, differ wi d e l y . ^

In Poland the councils share

authority on the question of wages with the shop commit
tees, a trade union organization heavily dominated by
the United Workers Party, the Polish Communist Party.
In certain other areas such as social welfare, social
security and working conditions the control of the
shop committee is predominant.
Convinced that centralized planning in the economic
system represents a law of socialist development, the
l6pior further discussion on Workers Councils in
Poland see Kazimierz Grzybowski, "The Polish Workers
Councils," Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol.
XVII (October, 1957), P P • 272-286.
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Party defined the function of the workers' councils to
cover the struggle against lack of discipline and
squandering^ organization of work and better utiliza
tion of the producers' capacity.1^

In essence the

workers' councils are competent to deal with economic
policy on the enterprise level which is not covered by
the plan directives and does not fall under the compe1ft
tence of the state organs dealing with the economy.
Although centralized planning of wages, prices and
investments is in effect, a certain amount of decentrali
zation of the administrative apparatus below the level
of ministries has been carried out.

But where in

Yugoslavia decentralization of the machinery went hand
in hand with the decentralization of authority, Poland
has seen little of the latter.

This feature is pointed

out by a critic who stated that:
If in the near future the system of economic
decentralization is not radically changed,
workers' councils may become one more of
the Stalinist fictions which make the pre
tense of the government of masses . . .
the law on the workers' councils as we
read it in the Law Gazette impresses the
^M. Smerderevac, "IX Plenum of the Polish United
Workers Party," Review of International Affairs, Vol. VIII
(June 1, 1957), p . 3; see also, "Current Developments:
Poland," East Europe, Vol. VI (April, 1957)> P P • 32-37C. Gripp, "East Europe's Ten Years of National
Communism, 1948-1958," Western Political Quarterly
Vol. XIII (December, I960), p. 941
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reader not as an act of victory of the
working masses hut as an act of self-defense
of the b u r e a u c r a c y .^9
The greater extent of the prices and investment funds
are centrally determined.

Production quotas are assigned

to the various branches of the economy and ultimately
to the individual enterprises.

However, profits achieved

in excess of the central plan in addition to profits
planned by the enterprise exceeding the output deter
mined by the central agency are not in their entirety
taken by the government but are partly left to the
administration of the enterprise which m a y decide on
4
their use. 20
-t

•

Whereas in Yugoslavia the establishment of the
workers'

councils represented a step toward the

decentralization of the administrative apparatus and
its authority and thus toward the withering away of the
state, no such ideological aim was present in Poland.
Decentralization here did not mean a step further toward
the disappearance of the state, it represented only a
concession to popular demand which could be retraced,
at least to a degree, under changed conditions.
the powers of the workers'

Indeed

councils were further curtailed

■^Grzybowski, op. c i t ., p. 284 citing Chelstowski,
"Samorzad robotniczy w niebizpieczentstwie," Prosto z
Mostu, January 20, 1957.» Cf. Nowe Drogi (1957).? No. 1,

^ " G o m u l k a in Retreat," E c o n o m i s t , Vol.
(October 1, i 960 ), p. 54.

CIIIC
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in 1958 following the attack of the Party against
further liberalization.
Another feature of the Yugoslav system that was
to a degree adopted in Poland was the delegation of
authority to local governing bodies.

The reforms did

not give to the Polish People's Councils independence
comparable to their Yugoslav counterpart.

Most of the

increased powers were delegated to the district or the
pi
province.
A strict hierarchical pattern of organi
zation is adhered to; each People's Council being
subordinated to the next higher body with the State
O p

Council in Warsaw retaining the power of dissolution. ^
The local government organs in Poland have little
economic independence when compared with those of
Yugoslavia.

They lack the authority to determine

taxes as well as investments.

However, their local

economic activity has reached a considerable degree
since certain sources of revenue were placed under the
control and administration of local government. J
In the field of agriculture the Polish reforms
have certain features in common with those previously
PI

Grzybowski, o£. cit., p. 273-

22Kazimierz Grzybowski, "Reforms of Government in
Poland," American Slavic Review, Vol. IX (December,
1958), p. 465-

23Ibid., p. 459-
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Instituted in Yugoslavia.

Following the upheavals of

1956, the forced collectivization of agriculture was
ended; and the Joining of agricultural collectives was
made entirely voluntary.

As a result, a large proportion

of the peasants left the artificially created collective
farms.

In Yugoslavia the decollectivization of agri

culture was accompanied by the recognition of the status
of the private peasant and the abolition of compulsory
deliveries of produce.

This was not the case in Poland

although compulsory delivery of grain was reduced by
p il

one-third.^

Whereas the Yugoslavs are confident that they can
build socialism without collectivization of agriculture
and that socialism in the rest of the country will pro
duce socialism in agriculture, the Poles insist that
ultimately collectivization of agriculture is essential
for the establishment of socialism.

j_n the near

future this goal is not to be pursued by force or coercion.
Hungary
Various changes that were introduced in the Hungar
ian system during the days of the revolution showed the
^"Poland's October Revolution," East Europe,
Vol. VI (January, 1957 )3 P- 925"Mr. Gomulka Consolidates," Economist, Vol. CXC
(March 293 1959)3 P- H 81+-
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Yugoslav impact.

One of the first moves of the revo

lutionaries was the establishment of workers’ councils
which had at this period considerable power., not unlike
p6
those in Yugoslavia.
The National Council of Trade
Unions called for the establishment of such councils
on October 2.6, 1956 .
In every producing factory a labor council
is to be set up in cooperation with the techni
cal intelligentsia . . .
Workers 1 Factory intellectuals!
Take the management of your factories in your
own hands. Form labor councils forthwith. 27
The workers' councils proved to be so popular that
Janos Kadar maintained this institution for an initial
period following the revolution.

Mr. Kadar’s post

revolutionary government made less of a gesture regard
ing the economic and political decentralization than that
of Mr. Gomulka.

Without this decentralization, however,

a meaningful function of the workers' councils is not
possible.

Late in 1957 the Hungarian government

abolished the councils and replaced them by so-called
shop councils in which the workers have little say.

?8

Another spontaneous action growing out of the
Hungarian revolt was the temporary decollectivization
of agriculture.

The Kadar government started new

"Documents from Budapest / 1 op. cit., p. 175*

2?Ibid., p. 173 .
2®"Current Developments: Hungary/' East Europe,
Vol. VII (January, 1958), p. 53*
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collectivization drives following the failure of the
revolution.

According to Hungarian officials neither

force nor coercion has been employed in the recollecti
vization drive.

By 19^3 almost 95 per cent of the

countryside had been organized into collective or state
farms.29
Despite the tendencies to curtail the changes
instituted during the revolution, the government of
Mr. Kadar has relaxed the police control, provided more
consumer goods and has to some degree decentralized the
administration.

Since the early sixties Mr. Kadar has

avoided no troubles in his attempt to stir a middle
course government by foregoing the extremes of the
Rakosi regime and the excess of the "counter revolu
tionaries" of 1956 .
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia, the one nation in which Soviet-type
socialism seemed to work reasonably well until the late

1950 's, experienced economic reforms during the last two
years.

Since i960 the rate of industrial growth had

fallen drastically, and the planners were unable to
29a . Rothberg, "Hungary, Seven Years after the
Revolt," Contemporary Review, Vol. CCIV (September,
1963), p. 123.
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cope successfully with the situation.

In 1963 a

number of Czech economists launched an attack against
the "cult of the plan."

Dr. Ota Sik, the main archi

tect of the later-adopted economic reforms., stated that
"ideological prejudices implying that socialist pro
duction cannot be regulated by the market must be
overcome."^
Driven by economic necessity the principles of the
economic reform were reluctantly accepted by the Central
Committee of the Party early last year.

Under the new

system central planning will remain, but it will con
cern itself with long-range drafts for a ten to fifteenyear period.

From these long-range aims more detailed

five-year plans will be derived.

According to the Czech

Premier Lenart, capital investments, relationships between
the various branches of the industry and the balance of
various regions of the country are to be determined and
ensured by the central plan.3^

Prices for raw materials

and for the basic necessities of life will also be fixed
by the central authorities.

Other produce, however,

is to be exempted from detailed planning as to make it
more responsive to the "laws" of supply and demand.
3°Harry G. Shaffer, "New Tasks for the Enterprise
Director," East Europe, Vol. XIII (August, 1964), p. 128.
31"Current Developments:
Czechoslovakia," East
Europe, Vol. XIII (December, 1964), p. 4332!lCurrent Developments:
Czecheslovakia, " East
Europe, Vol. XIV (March, 1965 ), P- 38-
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Enterprises are regarded as the basic industrial
units, and their initiative is sought.

Unproductive

plants are to he closed, and the performance of the
enterprises is to he measured by their profitability
rather than by their ability to meet the production
quotas.

Due to the fact that workers'participation

in management of the enterprise is not instituted by
the reforms, the enterprise director will gain a consi
derable amount of power and responsibility concerning
the performance of his shop.
The Soviet Union
The Soviet Union, like most of the Warsaw Pact
nations, experienced reforms that are to a degree simi
lar to those previously instituted in Yugoslavia.

A

general relaxation of the totalitarian features repre
sented by the curbed powers of the MVD took place in
the U.S.S.R.

In the agricultural field the machine

tractor stations were abolished.

In the economic sphere

decentralization of the administration was experienced;
and permanent producer councils, Party-union-management
troikas, were instituted in the factories to advise on
problems of planning and operation.
The over-centralization of the economic management
was recognized as extremely inefficient at the present
stage of economic complexity.

In the quest for a solution
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the Soviet leadership instituted reforms which, in
their first stage, aimed at regional economic manage
ment and later at the partial establishment of a market
economy.
The first stage of reforms represented a change
from central to regional planning.

The central minis

terial organization was replaced by 105 economic units
which were later reduced in number.33

pn each of these

regions, economic councils were set up which through
their subsidiary departments managed the individual
enterprises located within their jurisdiction except
those otherwise designated.

This we would call a change

from central to regional planning.

The councils were

not exclusively composed of professional administrative
employees but a certain number were delegates from
social organizations.3^
Although the newly created regional entities had
received a certain amount of power, centralized control
was maintained by central planning and financing.
U.S.S.R. Gosplan, the central planning agency, exercised
33paul Lydolph, "The Soviet Reorganization of
Industry," American Slavic and East European Review,
Vol. XVII (195b), p. 2953^1. Dabravic, "Reorganization of the Industrial
Management in the Soviet Union," Review of International
Affairs, Vol. VIII (June 16, 1957), p. 8.
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great power over economic units in regard to planning,
technological policy and the allocation of materials.
It was hoped that by bringing the management closer
to the production units the efficiency of the manage
ment would be maximized which in turn would increase
the production of the individual enterprise.

By mid-

1957 nine thousand employees had been transferred from
the central administration to the economy. ^

This also

represented a step further in the direction toward a
reduction of the power of the bureaucracy.
The administration of the economy on a regional
basis resulted in the emergence of regionalism which
could not be tolerated by the Soviet leadership.

Most

of the powers were taken away from the regional economic
councils and returned to the central administration with
the exception of those branches of the economy which
fell under the second set of reforms.
In accordance with the proposal of Professor
Liberman which was discussed by the Central Committee
of the Communist Party in November, 1962, certain enter
prises were released from the established planning pro
cedure.

The majority of the clothing and footwear

enterprises were placed within a market situation where
production is determined by the demands of the consumer
3^Ibid.,

p.

6.
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rather than by bureaucratic decision and where profita
bility becomes the measure of

p e r f o r m a n c e . ^

The same

operation is also tried in textile mills, tanneries
and other branches of the light industry.

It is also

planned to extend this system so as to include some
branches of the heavy industry.
With the exception of the industries subjected to
the market situation, the decentralization of government
authority in the economic sphere has not been as far
reaching as in Yugoslavia.

The central planning apparatus

remains intact; and the economy, save those enterprises
designated to operate in a market situation, is still
administered from the center.

The factories are still

essentially ruled by the

director of the enterprise.

The workers have only an

indirect say in the running of

the shop through the unions in the permanent producer
councils which have been

denied the function of manage

ment but act as advisory

bodies only.

The Soviet leadership has not made concessions to
the Yugoslav ideological framework save the recogni
tion of the concept of "independent roads to socialism."
The Yugoslav ideas concerning the withering away of the
state indeed have been derided by Moscow.
3^Alfred G-. Mayer, The Soviet Political System:
An Interpretation (New York: Random House, 19&5 ), P • 403.
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The Soviet leaders probably did not and never
intended to copy aspects of Yugoslav reforms., but while
moving toward new directions the Yugoslav experiment
and Yugoslav criticism of the Soviet system had had
some effect on the Soviet Union and the reforms that
were instituted in the post-Stalin period.

Viewing the

East European scene, it can be concluded that Yugoslavia'
insistence on the necessity of different paths to
socialism has had considerable impact.

The influence

of Yugoslav ideology seems to have been the strongest
during the period of the New Course and the initial
period of the Hungarian uprising.

In addition the

Rumanian communists voice some opinions similar to
those of the Yugoslavs as regards the relationships
between communist nations and parties and other ideas
dealing with the international scene.

Yugoslav impact

can be recognized in most of the economic reforms that
swept East Europe and the Soviet Union although this
influence may be more apparent than real.

Within the

framework of a reasonably centralized system,

the East

European nations as well as the Soviet Union have been
willing to integrate certain features of the Yugoslav
system into their system without, however,

adopting the

Yugoslav ideological justifications.
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C o n c lu s io n s

1.

Yugoslav ideology partly developed out of

pragmatic responses to pressing national and international
c onditions.

Without the hacking of the Soviet U n i o n ,

Tito's regime had to fall hack on its own resources.
In order to gain the support of the Yugoslav p e o p l e }
the regime had to satisfy hoth the communist and the
non-communist elements in the country.

The internal

policies which were followed after the hreak mirror
these considerations.

The regime guaranteed the co m 

munists the continued political dominance of their
Party.

The non-communists were assured of the relaxation

of oppressive measures in the political and economic
realms.
The economic approaches prescribed hy Soviet Russia
as the only path leading to socialism had brought the
Yugoslav state serious economic problems.

In the inter

national sphere the Yugoslav communists were faced by
the necessity of concluding trade and aid agreements with
the Western capitalist nations if Yugoslavia were to sur
vive the Cominform blocade.

It was from these considera

tions that the Yugoslav ideology received its direction
and its impetus.
2.

The ideological justifications for the novel

Yugoslav approaches were found in Marxist theory and
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were a r r iv e d a t b y way o f c r i t i c i z i n g

th e S o v ie t m o del.

Tito and his followers regarded their expulsion from the
Communist Bloc an unjust act.

Since they believed them

selves to be true followers of Marx and Lenin, it had to
be Stalin who had erred from the correct path.

The

Yugoslav ideologues set out to find where Stalin's
interpretation was at odds with the basic tenents of
Marxism and Leninism.

The Yugoslav criticism of the

Soviet model concentrated on those features of the Soviet
system which the Yugoslavs had already or were willing
to change in accordance with political and economic
requirements.

The Yugoslav criticism was, of course,

supported by quotations of Marx, Engels and Lenin so
as to give it validity.
3.

By incorporating Yugoslav nationalism into

the new ideological framework, the regime created consi
derable internal cohesion.

The regime was highly aware

of the rifts and divisions among the nationalities of
Yugoslavia.

These were just beginning to heal.

By

using Yugoslav nationalism against the Soviet Union and
by incorporating it into the new ideology, the regime
had created internal unity.

Furthermore, the fostering

of Yugoslav nationalism generated support for the
communist regime among the non-communist elements in
the country.
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4.

The liberalized version of communism will not

be reversed in Yugoslavia, yet communism will not be
abandoned as the official doctrine.

A reversion to

harsh communist policy would only be possible with the
backing of the Soviet Union since this policy would re
sult in the loss of support from those elements in the
country which the regime had gained during its liberali
zation campaign.

The Soviet Union has retreated from

the Stalinist interpretation of communism.

Under these

circumstances it is questionable whether the Soviet
regime would support a reimposition of a rigid Stalinist
system in Yugoslavia.

From this it can be concluded

that a reversion to a harsh and dogmatic communist policy
in Yugoslavia is highly improbable.
However, the regime cannot abandon communist poli
cies since most of the key positions within the country
are occupied by party members on whose loyalty it must
depend.

Hence, the regime can only go so far as to

revise communism; it cannot abandon it.
5.

Given Yugoslav ideology and Yugoslav practice,

the nation will neither rejoin the Soviet Bloc nor
become a full member of the Western alliance.

As far

as Yugoslav ideology is relevant to political action, it
precludes Yugoslavia's joining either one of the present
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power constellations.

By condeming any type of power

"bloc, the ideology commits the regime to a policy of
non-alignment.
The regime will not rejoin the Soviet Bloc because
this would mean to forfeit genuine domestic support for
hazardous Soviet backing.

It was, after all, the

domestic support which allowed the regime a substantial
area of flexibility in the international sphere.
Moreover, the regime withstood Soviet wooing to rejoin
the Soviet Bloc in the spring of 1955-

It is question

able whether the Soviet Union has become more attractive
to the Yugoslav regime after the uprisings in Eastern
Europe and Yugoslavia's new expulsion from the inner
councils of the Eastern Bloc.
On the other hand, Yugoslavia cannot become a fullfledged member of the Western Bloc because this action
would antagonize and frighten the Yugoslav communists on
whom the state machinery depends.

It would also mean

that the regime would open Itself to the charge of having
sold out communism, and this it cannot afford to do.
Furthermore, it is not certain that Yugoslavia, if
willing, would be a welcome addition to the Western
alliance as long as combatting communism per se remains
one of the objectives of Western policy.
6.

Yugoslav ideology and Yugoslav practice have

had, and are likely to continue to have, an impact on
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the policies of the Soviet Bloc.

Yugoslavia's formu

lation of the doctrine of different roads to socialism
and the Yugoslav example of a communist nation inde
pendent from the U.S.S.R. was partly responsible for
the uprisings in Eastern Europe in 1956.

Yugoslav

influence becomes clearly observable in the case of
Rumania.

The Rumanian regime justified its refusal to

follow the dictates of COMECON in a manner which closely
resembles those items of Yugoslav ideology concerned
with inter-communist relations.
Yugoslavia was the first bloc member which, ex
cluded from the communist worlds responded to existing
internal and international conditions in a pragmatic
manner.

Some of the problems which the regime faced

existed in the other East European nations as well.

By

studying the Yugoslav approaches, the governments of the
East European countries selected those features of the
Yugoslav system which seemed appropriate to their own
situations.
7.

Yugoslavia will not be able to exercise suffi

cient pull on the East European countries to effect their
defection from the Soviet Bloc.

In a liberalized Soviet

Bloc, where policy differences are permitted and where
the interests of the countries involved are given con
sideration, the price the East European regimes might
have to pay for a defection is hardly worth the try.
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Hungary serves as an example for all those who wish for
complete independence from the U.S.S.R.
Another reason why some East European nations5
especially Poland and Czechoslovakia^ will not defect
from the Soviet Union is their common fear of the revival
of German power.

Since Germany is a key-stone in the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization., the logical counter
balance for the East European countries is the Warsaw
Pact and the Soviet Union.

The German insistence of

keeping the issue of the Oder-Neisse line alive has been
one of the greatest booms to Soviet policy making in
defeating the aspirations of Tito’s national communism
in East Europe and will continue to be so.
The countries not directly effected by the German
"threat" such as Bulgaria and Rumania might not wish to
exchange Soviet domination for a Yugoslav Balkan federa
tion.

Furthermore., it is questionable whether the

Soviet Union would allow one.of the East European nations
to separate itself completely from the Warsaw Pact and
COMECON.
8.

The Soviet Bloc is not today and will never

again become a centralized monolith.

Within limits

each of the East European countries goes today its own
road to socialism.

Several of these nations have trade

agreements with the Western nations.

Soviet dictates

are not taken in silence whenever they are considered
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hazardous to the well-being of the nation concerned.
Rumania's refusal to accept its economic assignment in
COMECON provides an example of the relative independence
of the East European nations today.
What holds true for the Soviet Bloc holds true
for the communist world as a whole.

Given the existence

of a policentric communist movement it becomes questionable
whether a new communist nation somewhere in the world
represents an increase in power for the Soviet Union.
The foregoing conclusions are the result of the
previous evaluation of the Yugoslav ideology, the develop
ment of the Yugoslav system and its impact upon the
nations of the Soviet Bloc.

The writer hopes that the

previous analysis has shed a clearer light upon the
Yugoslav system, its ideology and the impact of the
Yugoslav position upon the East European nations and
the U.S.S.R.
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